FIR -Ashokbhai Vs State of Gujarat – Adulterated and Misbranded Ghee


                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
               CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
                          FIR/ORDER) NO. 6991 of 2014

================================================================ ASHOKBHAI KANUBHAI RAVANI & 1….Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 1….Respondent(s) ============================================================================== Appearance:

MS YS LAKHANI, SR COUNSEL with MR PRAVIN GONDALIYA, AD. for the Applicant(s) No. 1 – 2 MS NISHA THAKORE, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA Date :05/05/2017 CAV JUDGMENT

1. By   this   application,   the   applicants,  original accused, seek to invoke the inherent  powers   of   this   Court   praying   for   quashing   of  the   Criminal   Case   No.580   of   2008   pending   in  the   Court   of   the   learned   Chief   Judicial Magistrate,   Amreli   arising   from   the   First  Information Report being C.R. No. I­8 of 2008  registered   with   the   Amreli   Taluka   Police  Station,   Amreli   for   the   offence   punishable  under Sections 406, 420, 272 and 273 read with  Section   114   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   and  Sections 5(7), 16 and 17A of the Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act.

2. The   respondent   No.2,   original   first  informant, while on duty near the Savar­kundla  cross­road  by­pass  spotted  the  applicant  No.1  holding something in his hand. The respondent  No.2   inquired   with   the   applicant   No.1   as   to  what he had in his hands. The respondent No.2  noticed that the  applicant No.1 had a box of  “Ghee”.   The   respondent   No.2   drew   a   panchnama  of the  seizure of the box containing “Ghee” in  presence   of   the   local   witnesses.   The  respondent   No.2   had   an   information   that  adulterated “Ghee” was being sold in abundance  in   the   market.   In   such   circumstances,   the  respondent   No.2   had   kept   a   vigil   over   such  activity.   It   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution  that   the   “Ghee”   was   not   only   adulterated   but  the   same   was   also   misbranded.   In   such  circumstances,   the   respondent   No.2   registered   the First Information  Report for the offences  enumerated above.

3. At   the   end   of   the   investigation,   the  charge­sheet   came   to   be   filed   and   the   filing  of the charge­sheet culminated in the Criminal  Case   No.580   of   2008   pending   in   the   Court   of  the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amreli. 

4. Mr.   Lakhani,   the   learned   senior   counsel  appearing   with   Mr.   Gondaliya,   the   learned  counsel appearing for the applicants submitted  that   the   prosecution   instituted   against   the  applicants on a police report for the offence  punishable   under   the   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration Act is not tenable in law. It is  submitted   that   the   respondent   No.2   being   a  Police   Officer   had   no   authority   to   lodge   the  First   Information   Report   in   respect   of   the  offence   punishable   under   the   Provisions   of  Food Adulteration Act. It is further submitted  that   no   procedure   as   envisaged   under   the  Provisions   of   the   Act,   1954   and   the   Rules  framed thereunder, was followed at the time of  collecting the samples of “Ghee”. Mr. Lakhani,  the   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the  applicants   submitted   that   this   issue   is   no  longer  res integra  in view of the decision of this   Court   in   the   case   of  Shambhu   Dayal  Agrawal & Others v. State of Gujarat, reported  in 2003 (2) GLH 621.

5. Mr.   Lakhani,   the   learned   counsel   submits  that in such circumstances referred to above,  the   prosecution   for   the   offence   under   the  Indian Penal Code is also not tenable in law.  According   to   Mr.   Lakhani,   Sections   272,   273,  406   and   420   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   has   no  application so far as the fact of the present  case are concerned. 

6. Mr.   Lakhani   submitted   that   for   the   very  same   offences   the   Food   Inspector   lodged   a  complaint   in   the   Court   of   the   learned   Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Amreli culminating in the  Criminal   Case   No.841   of   2008.   The   said  complaint is for the offence punishable under  the   provisions   of   the   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act,   1954.   The   learned   Chief  Judicial   Magistrate   took   cognizance   upon   the  complaint   and   issued   process   against   the  applicant No.1 herein. Thus, according to Mr.  Lakhani, the applicant No.1 has already being  prosecuted   for   the   offence   alleged   under   the  Special   Act   relating   to   the   adulteration   of  food article. 

7. Mr.   Lakhani   prays   that   there   being   merit  in   this   application   relief   as   prayed   for   be  granted and the prosecution be quashed. 

8. On   the   other   hand,   this   application   has  been   vehemently   opposed   by   Ms.   Thakore,   the  learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing  for   the   State.   According   to   Ms.   Thakore,   the  Police   Officer   could   not   have   registered   the  First Information Report so far as the offence  under the Food Adulteration Act is concerned,  but, the prosecution is maintainable so far as  the   offence   under   the   Indian   Penal   Code   are  concerned. 

9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing  for   the   parties   and   having   considered   the  materials   on   record,   the   only   question   that  falls   for   my   consideration   is   whether   the  prosecution   instituted   against   the   applicants  deserves to be quashed. 

10. Let me straightway look into the judgment  of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Shambhu   Dayal  Agrawal  (supra).  In   the   said   case,   the   First  Information Report was lodged before the Unjha  Police   Station   for   the   offence   punishable  under   Sections   406,   420,   272,   273,   326,   328,  511 and 120­B of Indian Penal Code and Section  16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954. The First Information Report was lodged  by   the   Police­Sub­ Inspector   of   the   Unjha  Police   Station.   While   petrolling   the   Police­ Sub­ Inspector   received   an   information   that  certain   edible   goods   were   being   carried   in   a  truck. The Truck was intercepted. Neither the  driver nor the owner of the transport company  could render any satisfactory explanation, and  ultimately,   the   samples   were   collected   in  presence   of   the   Food   Inspector.   It   was   found  that the said edible goods were adulterated.

11. The   accused   –   Shambhu   Dayal   Agrawal   and  others   came   before   this   Court   by   filing   an  application under Section 482 of the Code. The  principal   argument   before   the   learned   Single  Judge   of   this   Court   was   that   the   Police  Officer   could   not   have   registered   the   First  Information   Report   for   the   alleged   offences.  The   learned   Single   Judge   accepted   the  contention   and   quashed   the   First   Information  Report   filed   by   the   Police­Sub­Inspector.   I  may   quote   the   observations   of   the   learned Judge as under:­ “6.  It  has  been  mainly  contended  that the  Police  Sub ­Inspector   has   no   authority   to   file   F.I.R.  before the Police for  the offences in question. In   fact,   even   looking   to   the   averments   made   in   the  F.I.R. no  offence can be said to have been made out   and therefore it would be an abuse of court process   to permit further investigation and submission of  the charge­ sheet at the end of the investigation by  the   Investigating   Officer   in   the   said   matter.  Therefore,   no   offence   has   been   made   even   prima  facie, therefore the F.I.R. may be quashed. 4. On  receipt   of   the   above   petition,   notice   was   issued  and rule was issued thereafter. 5. Learned A.P.P.  has appeared on behalf of the State. I have heard  the   learned   advocate   for   the   petition   and   the  learned   A.P.P.   for   the   State   who   have   taken   me  through the F.I.R. and legal aspects of the case. 

6.   It   has   been   mainly   contended   by   the   learned  advocate   for   the   petitioner   that   the   Police   Sub­ Inspector   has   no   authority   or   power   to   file   the  F.I.R.   or   complaint   in   respect   of   the   offences  punishable under the provisions of The Prevention  of Food Adulteration Act, 1954  (for short “the said  Act”). He has, drawn my attention to the provisions  made in the said Act.  If we go by the scheme of the  said   Act,   it   is   very   clear   that   the   powers   have   been given to  the Food Inspector for collecting the  samples and for sending them to the Public Analyst  and also to file complaint against the persons who   are found to be guilty of the offences punishable  under   the   said   Act.   In   the   present   case,   a   Food   Inspector appointed u/s 9 of the Act,  has not filed     the complaint but a F.I.R. has been filed by the  Police   Sub­ Inspector.   The   Police   Sub­ Inspector  cannot be equated with Food Inspector and therefore  the   Police   Sub­ Inspector   cannot   claim   any   right,  power   or   authority   to   file   the   F.I.R.   for   the  offences punishable under the said Act. 

7. It   is   required   to   be   considered   that   the  under   Section   12   of   the   said   Act,   even   the  purchaser has also been empowered to take samples  and   send   the   same   to   the   Public   Analyst   for  analysis.   In   the   present   case,   we   find   that   the  Police   Sub­Inspector   has   not   purchased   the   food  samples   in   question   and   therefore   he   is   not   a   purchaser. Therefore, he cannot file the complaint  or the F.I.R. even in his capacity as purchaser.

8.   Then   the   learned   advocate   for   the   petitioners   has   also   taken   me   through   the   provisions   of   the  Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Rules,1955  (hereinafter referred to as “the said Rules”).  Rule  9 of the said Rules, provides for the duties of the   Food Inspector and there are also provisions  as to   the manner in which food samples are required to be   collected.  In   the  present  case,  we   find  that  the  F.I.R.   etc.   do   not   speak   that   the   procedure   and  rules have been observed  and followed by the P.S.I.  while taking the samples. 

9. Rule 12 of the said Rules also states that when   the Food Inspector takes a sample of an article for   the purpose of analysis, he has to give notice of  his intention to do so in writing in form VI, then   and   there,   to   the   person   from   whom   he   takes   the   sample   and   simultaneously,   by   appropriate   means,  also to the persons if any, whose name, address and   other particulars have been disclosed  under Section  14­A   of   the   Act.   The   F.I.R.   does   not   state   that   this   process   was   undertaken   by   the   Police   Sub­ Inspector while taking the samples. 

10.   Then   Rule   14   of   the   said   Rules   provide   for  manner for sending samples for analysis. The F.I.R.  etc. do not show that this Rule was followed by the   Police   Sub­Inspector   while   forwarding   the   samples  to the Public Analyst. 

11. Rule 16 of the said Rules, provides for packing   and sealing the samples. The F.I.R. does not show  that   this   Rule   was   followed   while   packing   and  sealing the samples in question. 

12. Rule 17 of the said Rules, provides for manner  of despatching the containers of samples. Again the  F.I.R. is silent on the point as to whether this  procedure was followed by the Police Sub­Inspector  while despatching the samples in question. 

13. Rule 18 of the said Rules says that a copy of  memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used  to   seal   the   packet,   shall   be   sent,   in   a   sealed  packet   separately   to   the   Public   Analyst   by   any  means immediately but not later than the succeeding  working  day.   Again  the  F.I.R.  does  not   show  that  the   Police   Sub­Inspector   has   followed   this  provision   made   under   Rule   18   of   the   Rules   while  while sending the samples to the Public Analyst. 

14. Rule 19 further says that the preservatives are  required to be added in the food samples. Again the   F.I.R.   does   not   show   that   any   preservative   was  added to the food samples.

15. Section 10 (3) of the said Act provides that  the complainant is required to pay for the samples  purchased by him. In the present case, we find that   in the F.I.R. it is not stated that the price of   the   goods   in   respect   of   which   the   samples   were  collected was paid to the vendor. 

16. Section 11 of the said Act also provides that  after taking the samples, the same is required to  be divided into three parts, and one of the same is   required to be sent to the Public Analyst and two  other parts are required to be sent to the Local  (Health) Authority for the purpose of sub­section  (2) of this Section and sub­sections (2­A) and (2­ E) of Section 13. 

17. Section 13 of the said Act, says that even the   accused person has a right to obtain second opinion  from the Central Food Laboratory and the report of  the   said   Central   Food   Laboratory   would   be   a  separate   report   from   the   report   of   the   Public  Analyst.   There   is   nothing   in   the   F.I.R.   to   show  that  some  portion  of  the   samples  in   question  was  preserved   so   that   the   present   petitioners   could  request the concerned Court for sending the samples  to the  Central Food Laboratory. It is well settled  that   these   provisions   are   mandatory   and   are  required   to   be   strictly   complied   with.   If   the  petitioners are unable to exercise their right of   applying before the learned Magistrate for having  second   opinion   from   the   Central   Food   Laboratory,  then a very valuable right of the petitioners can  be   said  to   have  been  infringed  and  therefore  his  defence is likely to be adversely and pre judicially  affected. 

18. It is very clear that in the present case no   procedure as laid down in the said Act and Rules  has   been   followed   by   the   Police   Sub­ Inspector.  Learned A.P.P. is unable to say that the procedure  as   indicated   in   the   said   Act   and   Rules   has   been   followed. In that view of the matter, the samples  have been taken by the Police Sub ­Inspector without  following  procedure  as   laid  down  in   the  said  Act  and Rules. 

19.  On  one  hand,  the  Police  Sub­Inspector  is  not  competent   to   file   complaint   for   the   offences   punishable under the said Act and on the other hand   he is not the purchaser  as indicated  above. Even he   has   not   followed   the   procedure   required   to   be  followed for taking  the samples for preserving the  samples   and   for   despatching   the   samples   to   the  Public Analyst.  A valuable right of the petitioners  of having second opinion has been lost as there is  nothing   on   record   to   show   that   the   said   samples  have  been  preserved  as   aforesaid.  In   view  of  the  violation of the aforesaid mandatory provisions, it  is clear that no fruitful purpose will be served by   allowing   the   prosecution   to   go   ahead   with  investigation and trial. 

20.  It  is  well   settled  that  the  petitioners  have  right   of   getting   second   opinion   from   the   Central  Food Laboratory. Their defence can be said to have   been adversely affected and in that case also the  complaint is required to be quashed and set aside. 

21. In that case this is a fit case for exercising   discretionary jurisdiction and power under Section  482 of the Code for quashing and setting aside the  F.I.R.   Learned   A.P.P.   appearing   on   behalf   of   the  State is unable to support the case of the State or   of the Police Sub­Inspector. 

22.   For   the   foregoing   reasons,   this   petition   is  allowed. The First Information Report being  CR No.  22 of 2001 filed by the Police Sub­Inspector before  the   Unjha   Police   Station   and   consequent  investigation in respect thereof are ordered to be  quashed and set aside.  The petitioners shall not be  prosecuted in respect of the said offences on the  basis   of   the   F.I.R.   filed   by   the   Police   Sub­ Inspector.  This  does  not   mean  that  even  the  Food  Inspector   is   debarred   from   prosecuting   the  petitioners.   Rule   is   made   absolute   to   the   above  extent.”

12. My attention has been drawn to a Division  Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in  the   case   of  M/S   Pepsi   Co.   India   Holdings   v.  State  of  U.P.,  Writ  Petition  No.8254  of  2010  decided   on  8th  September,   2010  dealing   with  almost an identical issue.

13. In the said Writ­ Petition, the validity of  the   Government   order   dated   11.05.2010  directing   the   Police   to   register   cases   or  initiate   action   under   Section   272/273   of   IPC   was   questioned   on   the   ground   that   it   had  resulted in gross violation of the fundamental  rights   of   the   employees   and   agents   of   the  Company as available under Articles 14 and 21  of   the   Constitution   of   India.   The   argument  before   the   Division   Bench   was   that   on   coming  into force of the  PFA Act,  it repealed Section  272 and 273 IPC by necessary implication as it  occupied   complete   field   with   regard   to   the  “Adulteration   of   Food   Stuff”  and   also   on   the  principal   of   special   law   prevailing   over   the  general law to the extent Section 272/273 IPC  Code   covered   by   the   PFA   Act.   The   Division  Bench   while   allowing   the   writ­ petitions   and  quashing  the  impugned  Government  Order  issued  by the State Government held as under:­ “In   all   the   afore­ captioned   writ   petitions,  petitioners   have   questioned   the   validity   of   the  Government   Order   dated   11.5.2010   issued   by   the  State Government directing  the police  to register  cases or initiate action  under Sections 272/273 IPC  inter alia on the ground that it has resulted in   gross   violation   of   fundamental   rights   of   the  employee’s and agents of the Company as available  under   Article   14   and   21   of   the   Constitution   of  India and have consequently prayed for quashing of  the   FIR   registered   against   the   employees   of   the  Company   in   different   districts   of   the   State   of  Uttar   Pradesh.  

In writ petition no. 8254 (MB) of 2010, petitioner  no.2   Sumit   Sehgal   is   the   distributor   of   the  company,   who   has   been   arrested   on   11.8.2010   in  pursuance of FIR dated 11.8.2010 registered  as Case  Crime No. 392 of 2010 under Sections 272/273 IPC at  PS   Cantt.   District   Varanasi.  

In Writ Petition No. 8255 (MB) of 2010, petitioner  HC-NIC Page 11 of 74 Created On Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017 no.2 Wajid Ali is Quality Control Executive of the  Company and  petitioner no.3 Mohd. Shahid is Manager  of   the   CFA   Agency   of   the   company.   They   were  arrested   in   pursuance   of   the   FIR   dated   11.8.2010  registered  at  PS Khuldabad, District  Allahabad  as  Case Crime No. 244 of 2010 under Section 273 IPC   In writ petition no. 8256 (MB) of 2010, petitioners  were arrested pursuant to the FIR dated 12.8.2010  registered   at   police   station   Rohania   District  Varanasi   as   case   crime   no.   144/10   under   Section  419, 420, 467,468, 471 IPC and Section 7/16 of the  PFA Act and Rules 32, 49, 50 of the Rules framed  thereunder. In the said case, the prosecution moved  an   application   for   alteration   of   sections,   which  was   allowed   by   the   competent   Court   and   the  petitioners   were   remanded   only   under   Section   273  IPC and  Sections 51 and 57  of the Food Safety and  Standards   Act,   2006.  

Draped in brevity, the facts of the case are that  the   petitioner­   Pepsico   India   Holdings   Private  Limited,   is   a   company   registered   under   the  provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The company  is engaged in the business of manufacturing of soft  drinks   inter­alia   under   the   brand   name   of   PEPSI,  Lehar, 7UP, Slice and Miranda etc. The company is  aggrieved by the issuance of  the  Government Order  dated 11.5.2010 issued by the State Government as  it   gives   unfettered   powers   to   the   authorities   to  initiate   action   against   violators   or   suspected  violators for food  adulteration and misbranding by  invoking Sections 272/273 IPC by registering FIRs.  After   the   issuance   of   the   aforesaid   Government  Order, various products of the Company were seized  from the go­down and FIRs were registered against  the officers/agents of  the  company  under Sections  272/273 IPC and Section 7/16 of the Prevention of  Food   Adulteration   Act,   1954   [hereinafter   referred  to   as   the   ‘PFA   Act’].  

Sri   Nagendra   Rao,   learned   Counsel   for   the  petitioners, while giving a summary of the history  of legislation on Food laws, took us to the past   and   stated   that   Chapter   XIV   of   the   Indian   Penal  Code   deals   with   “Offences   affecting   the   public  health”. Sections 272 and 273  IPC deal with public  health   by   making   penal   offences   pertaining   to  adulteration of food etc.  and sale of noxious food  or   drink.   Thereafter   the   Parliament   in   the   year  1954 enacted  “The Prevention of Food  Adulteration  Act,   1954”   which   was   a   complete   code   in   itself  providing for various penalties for adulteration of  food   stuff   and   other   related   subjects.   It   also  HC-NIC Page 12 of 74 Created On Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017 provided   an   exhaustive   procedure   for   the   inquiry  and   trial   of   such   offences,   regulating   the  manufacture, sale and distribution etc of “Food”. 

According to Counsel for the petitioners, on coming  into force of the PFA Act, it repealed Sections 272  and 273 IPC by necessary implication as it occupied  complete   field   with   regard   to   ‘adulteration   of  foodstuff’ and also on the principle of a special  law   prevailing   over   a   general   law   to   the   extent  Sections 272/273 IPC got covered by the PFA Act. In  the said PFA Act and Sections 272 IPC,  the  State of  Uttar Pradesh brought amendments in the year 1975  whereby Section 16 of the PFA Act  was amended and  the   period   of   imprisonment   of   6   years   was  substituted with  ‘imprisonment for life’.  Similarly  amendments   were   incorporated   in   Section   272   IPC,  whereby   imprisonment   for   six   months   was   also  substituted   by   ‘imprisonment   for   life’.   The  offences   under   both   the   aforesaid   Acts   were   also  made   cognizable   and   non ­bailable.   Thereafter,   the  Parliament made further amendments to the PFA Act  through the Act No. 34 of 1976.  By this amendment  graded punishment based on the degree of violation  was   introduced.   Recently,   the   Parliament   in   the  year 2006 passed the Food Safety and Standards Act  (in   short,   referred   to   as   ‘FSSA’).   Various  provisions of FSSA were notified from time to time  but finally on  29th July, 2010, Section 97 of FSSA,  which   repealed   all   other   food   related   laws,   was  notified.  

It   has   been   vehemently   argued   that   invocation   of  sections   272/273   IPC   by   registering   the   impugned  FIR originate  from the  impugned Government Order,  is   in   clear   violation   of   Article   14   of   the  Constitution, as in any other part of the Country,  if   there   is   any  adulteration,  same  will   be   dealt  with   under   FSSA   by   following   the   procedure   laid  down therein. Astonishingly, the authorities in the  State  of   U.P.   are   not  invoking  the  provisions  of   FSSA   and   instead   the   persons   are   being   arrested  under sections 272/273 IPC  thereby the fundamental  rights of the petitioners as guaranteed by Article  14 stand violated  since in cases where provisions  of FSSA are invoked the defaulter gets benefit of  procedure and  safeguards as provided under the Act  whereas   in   the   present   cases,   pursuant   to   the  Government   Order,   referred   to   above,   the  authorities have chosen to  invoke sections 272/273 IPC  without even waiting for the report of Public  Analyst. Since the alleged offence as disclosed in  the   FIR   are   covered  under   the   provisions  of   FSSA   and   as   such   there   cannot   be   any   violation   of  section   272/273   IPC.  

Elaborating his arguments, Sri Nagendra Rao argued  that there are certain ingredients for constituting  an   offence   under   section   272   IPC.   Similarly,  section   273   requires   certain   ingredients   to   be  fulfilled before the offence of adulteration can be  said   to   be   made   out.   The   ingredients   are   that  somebody selling the food article or drinks which  has been rendered noxious or unfit for food/drink  with   such   knowledge   or   having   reasons   to   believe  that   the   same   is   noxious   food   item.   To   put  differently,   sections   272/273   IPC   are   only  attracted, if it is shown that the adulteration is  deliberate,  intentional  or  with the  knowledge.  In  the   absence   of   any   such   evidence   or   allegations,  the ingredients of offence  under sections 272/273 IPC are not constituted.  In any event intention to  adulterate   or   the   knowledge   that   the   product   is  adulterated   cannot   be   remotely   attributed   to   the  petitioners nor there is any such allegation in the  complaint.  

Learned   Counsel   for   the   petitioners   next   argued  that   the   impugned   Government   Order   directing   the  subordinates   to   initiate   action   under   Sections  272/273   IPC   is   completely   misconceived   in   law   as  Sections   272/273   IPC   are   not   applicable   to   the  cases of  food adulteration as upto 29th July, 2010  all such cases were required to be dealt under the  PFA Act and with effect from 29th July, 2010 the   provisions   of   the   said   PFA   Act   and   other   food  related   laws   relating   to   sampling,   imposition   of  penalties   for   adulteration   and   other   connected  matters have been repealed by the introduction of  Food   Safety   and   Standards   Act,   2006.  

On the strength of paras 15 and 20 of the judgment  rendered   in   Jeewan   Kumar   Raut   and   another   v.  Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   [2009   (7)   UJ   SC  3135], Sri Rao vehemently argued that action of the  respondents   in   registering   the   F.I.R.   instead   of  proceeding  as  per procedure, prescribed under the  FSSA, is highly unjustified and illegal. The said  judgment   relates   to   the   Transplantation   of   Human  Organs   Act,   1994,   which   has   been   referred   to   as  ‘TOHO’   therein.   Paragraphs   15   and   20   of   the  judgment,   on   which   reliance   has   been   placed,   are  reproduced   hereunder:­   “15. TOHO being a special statute, Section 4 of the  Code,   which   ordinarily   would   be   applicable   for  investigation   into   a   cognizable   offence   or   the  other provisions, may not be applicable. Section 4  HC-NIC Page 14 of 74 Created On Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017 provides   for   investigation,   inquiry,   trial,   etc.  according   to   the   provisions   of   the   Code.   Sub­ section   (2)   of   Section   4,   however,   specifically  provides that offences  under any other law shall be  investigated,   inquired   into,   tried   and   otherwise  dealt   with   according   to   the   same   provisions,   but  subject   to   any   enactment   for   the   time   being   in  force   regulating   the   manner   or   place   of  investigating,   inquiring   into,   tried   or   otherwise  dealing   with   such   offences.   TOHO   being   a   special  Act   and   the   matter   relating   to   dealing   with  offences there under having been regulated by reason  of   the   provisions   thereof,   there   cannot   be   any  manner   of   doubt   whatsoever   that   the   same   shall  prevail   over   the   provisions   of   the   Code.  

20.It is a well­settled principle of law that if a  special statute lays down procedures, the ones laid  down   under   the   general   statutes   shall   not   be  followed.   In   a   situation   of   this   nature,   the  respondent   could   carry   out   investigations   in  exercise of its authorization under Section 13 (3) 

(iv)   of   TOHO.   While   doing   so,   it   could   exercise  such powers which are  otherwise vested in it.  But,  as   it   could   not   file   a   police   report   but   a  complaint petition only; Sub­section (2)  of Section  167    of   the   Code   may   not   be   applicable.   The  provisions  of  the  Code,  thus,  for   all   intent   and   purport,   would   apply   only   to   an   extent   till  conflict arises between  the provisions of the Code  and   TOHO   and   as   soon   as   the   area   of   conflict  reaches,   TOHO   shall   prevail   over   the   Code.  Ordinarily,   thus,   although   in   terms   of   the   Code,  the respondent upon completion of investigation and  upon obtaining remand of the accused from  time to  time, was required to file a police report, it was  precluded from doing so by reason  of the provisions  contained   in   Section   22   of   TOHO.   To   put   it  differently, upon completion  of the investigation,  an authorized officer could only file a complaint  and not a police report,  as a specific bar has been  created   by   the   Parliament.   In   that   view   of   the  matter, the police report being not a complaint and  vice­ versa,  it  was  obligatory  on  the  part  of   the   respondent to choose the said method invoking the  jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned for taking  cognizance of the offence only in the manner laid  down   therein   and   not   by   any   other   mode.   The  procedure laid down in TOHO, thus, would permit the  respondent   to   file   a   complaint   and   not   a   report  which   course   of   action   could   have   been   taken  recourse   to   but   for   the   special   provisions  contained   in   Section   22   of   TOHO.”  

 Placing reliance on Jatinder Kumar Jain vs. State  of   Punjab;   [2008(2)   FAC   437]   learned   Counsel   for  the petitioners has argued that registering of the  FIRs under the Penal Code  against the employees   and  agent   of   the   company   without   following   the  procedure   laid   down   in   the   special   statute   i.e.  FSSA   is   not   permissible.  

Referring to the case of Jamiruddin Ansari v. CBI;  (2009)6   SCC   316,   Sri   Rao   submitted   that   in   this  case the Apex Court has held that the provisions of  Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act  (MCOCA)  would have an overriding effect over the provisions  of Code of Criminal Procedure.  In paragraph 67 of  the   report,   the   Apex   Court   observed   as   under:­   ” We are also inclined to hold that in view of the   provisos of section 25 of MCOCA, the provisions of  the said Act would have an overriding effect over  the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and  the learned Special Judge would not, therefore, be  entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 156(3)  CrPC  for   ordering  a   special   inquiry  on   a   private  complaint and taking  cognizance thereupon,  without  traversing   the   route   indicated   in   Section   23   of  MCOCA.”  

On behalf of the State, it has been argued that the  impugned Circular dated 11.5.2010 is nothing, but a   direction to follow the rule of law as it had come  to the knowledge of the State Government that the  FIRs   are   not   being   registered   by   the   Food  Inspectors and Drug Inspectors even in the case of  cognizable   offences.   The   said   Circular   is   only   a  reminder to the authorities  to do work according  to  law and nothing else. It is incorrect to say that  FIRs have been registered pursuant to the circular  dated   11.5.2010.  

During the course of argument, a feign attempt was  also   made   regarding   maintainability   of   the   writ  petition   at   Lucknow   as   no   cause   of   action   has  arisen   within   the   territorial   jurisdiction   of  Lucknow.   However,   this   point   was   not   seriously  pressed  when  it   was   pointed   out   that   the  primary  relief   relates   to   the   quashing   of   the   Government  Order/Circular dated 11.5.2010  and the quashing for  FIRs   is   the   consequential   relief.  

Learned State Counsel  has also pointed out that the  Act of 2006 is a Central Act. Various provisions of  the   said   Act   of   2006   have   been   notified   in   the  official gazette on various dates.  Some provisions  of the said Act came into force on 15.10.2007, some  provisions   came   into   force   on   25.7.2008,   some   on 28.8.2008,   some   on   11.8.2008,   some   on   9.3.2009,  some  on   26.6.2009,  some  on   31.7.2009  and  last   by   some on 29.7.2010. Therefore, the Union of India is  a   necessary   party   to   place   various   objects   and  reasons including the Doctrine of Implied Repeal.  Moreover,   Section   29(1)   of   the   FSSA   deals   with  express repeal, which provides that the enactments  and   orders   specified   in   the   Second   Schedule   have  been   repealed   from   29.7.2010   i.e.   the   appointed  date. The Second Schedule mentions about 8 Acts or  orders   in   which   not   a   single   provisions   of   the  Penal  Code  has   been   mentioned.  Thus,  it   is   clear  that the relevant  provisions of the Penal Code i.e.  Sections 272 and 273 have not been repealed by any  express   provision.   In   support   of   this   contention  reliance   has   been   placed   upon   State   of   M.P.   vs.  Kedia  Leather  and  Liquor  Ltd  and   others   (2003)  7   SCC   389.  

It has been vehemently argued that the provisions  of   the   Penal   Code   shall   not   be   repealed   unless  there  is   express  provision  to  that  effect  as   was   done by the Parliament  while enacting Prevention of  Corruption   Act.   Moreover,   the   provisions   of   the  FSSA and the  relevant provisions of the Penal Code  are   not   contradictory   to   each   other.   Reliance   in  this  regard  has   been   placed   on   Basti  Sugar  Mills  Co. Ltd. vs. State o U.P. and another (1979) 2 SCC 

86.   In   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   (Cr.P.C.),  there   are   various   stages   like   investigation,  cognizance, prosecution, conviction, sentence which  are altogether different to the procedure provided  in the FSSA as such the provisions of FSSA do not  have   any   overriding   effect   upon   the   relevant  provisions   of   the   Cr.P.C..   Furthermore,   the  assertion of the petitioners that the instant case  is   fully   covered   with   the   decision   of   the   Apex  Court   in   Jeevan   Kumar   Raut’s   (supra)   is   wholly  misconceived as in the instant case, the relevant  provisions of the Code  remained intact  as doctrine  of   implied   repeal   is   not   applicable.  

Lastly, it has been submitted that in clause 3(j)  of the definition clause of FSSA, the word “food”  has   been   defined.   The   recovered   article   does   not  come   within   the   meaning   of   “Food”   as   such   the  provisions   of   FSSA   are   not   applicable   in   the  present   case.  

Countering   the   allegations   of   the   State   Counsel,  petitioners’   Counsel   submitted   that   assertions   of  the State Counsel that date of repeal is yet to be  notified is  wholly fallacious as the  notification  bringing into force Section 97 of the FSSA has tobe read in light of Section 1(3) and  Section 5(3)  of   the   General   Clauses   Act.   A   bare   reading   of  Section 97(1) with the  second Schedule   as well as  Column   Comments   under   the   caption   “Notes   on  Clauses”   supplied   with   the   Act   will   make   it  abundantly clear  that “this section seeks to repeal  the   enactment   and   orders   specified   in   second  Schedule immediately w.e.f. the date on which Act  is   enacted   and   comes   into   force.  

Clarifying the position, it has been submitted that  section 97(2) is not dependent on Section 97(1) and  it has come into force on 29th July, 2010. By the  impact   of   Section   97(2)   all   State   Amendments  corresponding   to   FSSA   stand   repealed,   meaning  thereby if subject  matter of any  State Amendment is  included in FSSA, the same stands repealed w.e.f.  29th   July,   2010   since   State   Amendment   amending  section 272 and section 273 IPC and section 16 PFA  Act   deals   with   the   same   subject   of   food  adulteration   which   is   now   fully   covered   by   FSSA,  the same stands repealed irrespective of the fact  that whether PFA Act is repealed or not. In fact,  the State by its own admission has accepted repeal  of PFA Act in the FIR impugned in Writ Petition No.  8255   (MB)   of   2010.   Originally,   the   State   had  invoked   Section   16   PFA   Act   which   has   now   been  replaced   by   Section   51   and   57   of   FSSA.  

Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that  definition of ‘food’ is an inclusive definition and  includes any substance which is intended for human  consumption.   The   word   ‘substance’   as   defined   in  Section   2   (zw)   of   FSSA   includes   any   natural   or  artificial substance  or other matter, whether it is  in solid state or in liquid form or in the form of   gas or vapour.  It is nobody’s case that carbonated  drinks   or   juice   based   beverages   are   not   intended  for   human   consumption   or   that   they   are   not  substances   for   the   purposes   of   Section   2   (zw).  Moreover,   under   Section   5   of   PFA   Act,   standards  were laid for various food  articles in  Appendix B.  In Appendix B, carbonated water is defined in entry  A.01.01 Similarly juice based  beverages are   defined  in Entry A.15 of Appendix B. By virtue of Section  98,   the   rules   including   Appendix   B   have   been  temporarily   transported   to   FSSA   till   the  regulations under  the FSSA are notified.   It would,  therefore, be absurd to contend that although the  standards for this product are provided treating it  to   be   food   stuff,   but   it   otherwise   is   not   an   article   of   food.  

Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also urged  HC-NIC Page 18 of 74 Created On Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017 that   sale   of   unsafe   food   is   a   violation   under  Section 59 of FSSA  where the punishment varies from  six months to seven years. Unsafe food is defined  under Section 2 (zz) of FSSA, which also includes  food   which   is   harmful   to   health   or   repugnant   to  human use. Reliance has also placed on the judgment  passed   by   a   Division   Bench   of   the   Hon’ble   High  Court   of   Kerala   in   Chami   vs.   Excise   Inspector  [(2006  (1)  KLT   511)]   wherein  the   Court   has   dealt  with the definition and the interpretation of the  word  ‘noxious’  and  has  come   to   the  conclusion  at   Para 4 that for a substance to become noxious it   should   be   harmful   to   health.  

The   Ministry   of   Health   and   Family   Welfare,   New  Delhi issued a notification  dated 29th July, 2010   with   regard   to   coming   into   force   of   various  provisions   of   the   FSSA,   2006.   The   notification  reads   as   under:­   “S.O.1855(E):­ In exercise of the powers conferred  by sub­section(3) of Section 1 of the Food Safety  and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), the Central  Government   hereby   appoints   the   29th   day   of   July,  2010 as the date on which  the provisions of Section  19 to 21 (both inclusive), Sections 23 to 29 (both  inclusive),   Sections   31   to   35(both   inclusive),  Sections   48   to   80(   both   inclusive),   Sections   89,  Section 94 to 98 ( both inclusive) and Section 100  of   the   said   Act,   shall   come   into   force.”  

As   much   emphasis   has   been   laid   on   the   various  provisions   of   the   FSSA,   we   deem   it   proper   to  reproduce certain relevant  provisions  of the Act.  FSSA was enacted  by the Parliament  with a view to  consolidate   the   laws   relating   to   food   and   to  establish the  Food Safety  and Standards Authority  of   India   for   laying   down   science   based   standards  for   articles   of   food   and   to   regulate   their  manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import  to ensure  availability of safe and wholesome food  for   human   consumption   and   for   matters   connected  therewith.  

The   statement   of   object   and   reasons   of   the   Act  reads   as   under:­   (1)   Multiplicity   of   foods   laws,   standard   setting  and enforcement agencies pervades different sectors  of   food,   which   creates  confusion  in  the   minds   of   consumers,   traders,   manufacturers   and   investors.  Detailed   provisions   under   various   laws   regarding  admissibility   and   levels   of   foods   additives,  contaminants,   food   colours,   preservatives,   etc.,  and   other   related   requirements   have   varied  standards under these laws. The standards are often  rigid and non ­responsive to scientific  advancements    and modernization. In view of multiplicity of laws,  their enforcement  and   standard setting as well as  various   implementing   agencies   are   detrimental   to  the growth of  the nascent food processing industry  and is not conducive to effective fixation of food  standards   and   their   enforcement.  

(2)   In   as   early   as   in   the   year   1998,   the   Prime  Minister’s Council on  Trade and Industry  appointed   a Subject Group on  Food and Agro Industries,  which  had   recommended   for   one   comprehensive   legislation  on Food with a Food Regulatory Authority concerning  both   domestic   and   export   markets.   Joint  Parliamentary   Committee   on   Pesticide   Residues   in  its report in 2004 emphasized the need to converge  all   present   food   laws   and   to   have   a   single  regulatory   body.   The   Committee   expressed   its  concern on public health and food safety in India.  The Standing Committee of Parliament on Agriculture  in its 12th Report  submitted in   April 2005 directed  that the much needed legislation on Integrated Food  Law   should   be   expedited.  

(3)   As   an   on   going   process,   the   then   Member­ Secretary,   law   Commission   of   India,   was   asked   to  make a comprehensive review of Food Laws of various  developing   and   developed   countries   and   other  relevant   international   agreements   and   instruments  on the subject. After making an indepth survey of  the   International   scenario,   the   then   Member­ Secretary recommended that the new Food Law be seen  in   the   overall   prospective   of   promoting   nascent  food   processing   industry   given   its   income,  employment   and   export   potential.   It   has   been  suggested that all acts and orders relating to food  be subsumed within  the proposed  Integrated Food Law  as the international trend is towards modernization  and   convergence   of   regulations   of   Food   Standards  with   the   elimination   of   multi­level   and   multi­ departmental  control. Presently, the emphasis is on 

(a)   responsibility   with   manufactures,   (b)   recall, 

(c) Genetically Modified and Functional Foods, (d)  emergency   control,   (e)   risk   analysis   and  communication   and   (f)   Food   Safety   and   Good  Manufacturing Practices and Process Control, viz.,  Hazard   Analysis   and   Critical   Control   Point.  

(4)   In   this   background,   the   Group   of   Ministers  constituted   by   the   Government   of   India,   held  extensive   deliberations   and   approved   the   proposed  Integrated Food Law  with certain modifications. The  Integrated   Food   Law   has   been   named   as   ‘The   Food  Safety   and   Standards   Bill,   2005’.   The   main  objective   of   the   Bill   is   to   bring   out   a   single  statute   relating   to   food   and   to   provide   for   a   systematic   and   scientific   development   of   Food  Processing Industries. It is proposed to establish  the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India,  which will fix food standards and regulate/monitor  the manufacturing, import, processing, distribution  and   sale   of   food,   so   as   to   ensure   and   wholesome  food   for   the   people.   The   Food   Authority   will   be  assisted   by   Scientific   Committees   and   Panels   in  fixing   standards   and   by   a   Central   Advisory  Committee   in   prioritization   of   the   work.   The  enforcement of the  legislation will be through the  State   Commissioner   for   Food   Safety,   his   officers  and   Panchayati   Raj/   Municipal   bodies.”  

Section 3 of the Act is the definition clause and  defines   ‘adulterant’   ‘contaminant’   ‘food’   ‘food  additive’ ‘food business’ ‘hazard’, ‘manufacture’,  ‘sale’,   ‘substance’,   ‘sub­standard’   and   ‘unsafe  food’ amongst other words, which read as under:­   “(a ) “adulterant” means any material which is or  could   be   employed   for   making   the   food   unsafe   or  sub­standard, mis­branded or  containing  extraneous  matter;  

(g) “contaminant” means  any substance,  whether  or  not   added   to   food,   but   which   is   present   in   such  food   as   a   result   of   the   production   (including  operations   carried   out   in   crop   husbandry,   animal  husbandry   or   veterinary   medicine),   manufacture,  processing,   preparation,   treatment,   packing,  packaging, transport or holding of such food or as  a   result   of   environmental   contamination   and   does  not   include   insect   fragments,   rodent   hairs   and  other   extraneous   matter;  

(j) “food” means any substance, whether processed,  partially   processed   or   unprocessed,   which   is  intended for human consumption and includes primary  food,   to   the   extent   defined   in   clause   (ZK)  genetically   modified   or   engineered   food   or   food  containing such ingredients, infant food, packaged  drinking water, alcoholic  drink, chewing gum, and  any substance, including water used into the food  during   its   manufacture,   preparation   or   treatment  but does not include any animal feed, live animals  unless they are prepared or processed for placing  on the market for human consumption, plants prior  to   harvesting,   drugs   and   medicinal   products,  cosmetics,   narcotic   or   psychotropic   substances:   Provided that  the Central  Government  may declare,  by notification in the Official Gazette, any other  article as food for the purposes of this Act having  regards to its use, nature, substance or quality; 

(k)   “food   additive”   means   any   substance   not  normally consumed as a food by itself or used as a  typical ingredient of the food, whether or not it  has   nutritive   value,   the   intentional   addition   of  which   to   food   for   a   technological   (including  organoleptic)   purpose   in   the   manufacture,  processing,   preparation,   treatment,   packing,  packaging,   transport   or   holding   of   such   food  results,   or   may   be   reasonably   expected   to   result  (directly or indirectly), in it or its by­products  becoming a component of or otherwise affecting the  characteristics of such food but does not include  “contaminants”   or   substances   added   to   food   for  maintaining   or   improving   nutritional   qualities;  

(n) “food business” means any undertaking, whether  for   profit  or   not   and  whether  public  or  private,  carrying out any of the activities related to any  stage   of   manufacture,   processing,   packaging,  storage,   transportation,   distribution   of   food,  import   and   includes   food   services,   caterings  services,   sale   of   food   or   food   ingredients;  

(u)   “hazard”   means   a   biological,   chemical   or  physical agent in, or condition of, food with the  potential   to   cause   an   adverse   health   effect;  

(zd ) “manufacturer” means a person engaged in the  business of manufacturing any article of food for  sale   and   includes   any   person   who   obtains   such  article from another person  and packs and  labels it  for   sale   or   only   labels   it   for   such   purposes;  

(zr)   “sale”   with   its   grammatical   variations   and  cognate expressions, means the sale of any article  of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of   exchange   and   whether   by   wholesale   or   retail,   for  human   consumption   or   use,   or   for   analysis,   and  includes an agreement  for sale,  an offer for sale,  the exposing for sale or having in possession for  sale   of   any   such   article,   and   includes   also   an  attempt   to   sell   any   such   article;  

(zw) “substance” includes any natural or artificial  substance or other matter, whether it is in a solid  state or in liquid form or in the form of gas or  vapour;  

(zx) “sub­standard” ­ an article of food shall be  deemed to be sub­ standard if it does not meet the  specified   standards   but   not   so   as   to   render   the  article   of   food   unsafe;  

(zz) “unsafe food” means an article of food whose  nature, substance or quality is so affected as to  render   it   injurious   to   health:  

(i)by the article itself, or its package thereof,  which  is   composed,  whether  wholly  or  in   part,   of   poisonous   or   deleterious   substances;   or  

(ii)by the article consisting , wholly or in part,  of   any   filthy,   putrid,   rotten,   decomposed   or  diseased   animal   substance   or   vegetable   substance;  or  

(iii)by virtue of its unhygienic processing or the  presence in that article of any harmful substance;  or  

(iv)by the substitution of any inferior or cheaper  substance   whether   wholly   or   in   part;   or  

(v)by   addition   of   a   substance   directly   or   as   an  ingredient   which   is   not   permitted;   or  

(vi)by the abstraction, wholly or in part, of any  of   its   constituents;   or  

(vii)by the article being so coloured, flavoured or  coated,   powdered   or   polished,   as   to   damage   or  conceal the article or to make it appear better or  of   greater   value   than   it   really   is;   or  

(viii)by   the   presence   of   any   colouring   matter   or  preservatives other than  that specified in  respect  thereof;   or  

(ix)by the article having been infected or infested  with   worms,   weevils   or   insects;   or  

(x)by virtue of its being prepared, packed or kept  under   insanitary   conditions;   or  

(xi)by   virtue   of   its   being   mis­branded   or   sub­ standard or food containing extraneous matter; or 

(xii)by virtue  of containing pesticides and other  contaminants  in excess  of  quantities  specified  by  regulations.”  

Section   41   deals   with   power   of   search,   seizure,  investigation,   prosecution   and   procedure   whereas  section 42 deals with the procedure for launching  prosecution.   Both   the   sections   reads   as   under:­  

41.   Power   of   search,   seizure,   investigation,  prosecution   and   procedure   thereof   ­   (1)  Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­section  (2)   of   section   31,   the   Food   Safety   Officer   may  search   any   place,   seize   any   article   of   food   or  adulterant,   if   there   is   a   reasonable   doubt   about  them   being   involved   in   commission   of   any   offence  relating   to   food   and   shall   thereafter   inform   the  Designated Officer of the actions taken by him in  writing:  

Provided   that   no   search   shall   be   deemed   to   be  irregular by reason only of the fact that  witnesses  for the search are not inhabitants of the locality  in   which   the   place   searched   is   situated.  

(2)   Save   as   in   this   Act   otherwise   expressly  provided,   provisions   of   the   Code   of   Criminal  Procedure,   1973   relating   to   search,   seizure,  summon, investigation and prosecution, shall apply,  as far as may be, to all action taken by the Food  Safety   Officer   under   this   Act.  

42. Procedure for launching prosecution ­ (1) The  Food   Safety   Officer   shall   be   responsible   for  inspection   of   food   business,   drawing   samples   and  sending   them   to   Food   Analyst   for   analysis.  

(2)   The   Food   Analyst   after   receiving   the   sample  from   the   Food   Safety   Officer   shall   analyse   the  sample   and   send   the   analysis   report   mentioning  method   of   sampling   and   analysis   within   fourteen  days   to   Designated   Officer   with   a   copy   to  Commissioner   of   Food   Safety.  

(3)   The   Designated   Officer   after   scrutiny   of   the  report of Food Analyst shall decide  as to whether  the   contravention   is   punishable   with   imprisonment  or   fine   only   and   in   the   case   of   contravention  punishable   with   imprisonment,   he   shall   send   his  recommendations   within   fourteen   days   to   the  Commissioner   of   Food   Safety   for   sanctioning  prosecution.  

(4) The Commissioner of Food Safety shall, if he so  deems fit decide, within the period prescribed by  the   Central   Government,   as   per   the   gravity   of  offence,   whether   the   matter   be   referred   to,­­  

(a)   a   court   of   ordinary   jurisdiction   in   case   of  offences punishable with  imprisonment  for a term up  to   three   years;   or  

(b) a Special Court in case of offences punishable  with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years  where such Special Court is established and in case  no Special Court is established, such cases shall  be   tried   by   a   court   of   ordinary   jurisdiction.  

(5)   The   Commissioner   of   Food   Safety   shall  communicate his decision to the Designated Officer  and   the   concerned   Food   Safety   Officer   who   shall  launch   prosecution   before   courts   of   ordinary  jurisdiction or Special Court, as the case may be;  and   such   communication  shall  also  be  sent  to   the   purchaser if the sample was taken under section 40. 

Chapter IX of the Act deals with the offences and  Penalties   with   regard   to   adulteration   of   food  stuff, the relevant provisions of the statute read  as   under:­   “48. General provisions relating to (1 ) A person  may render any article of food injurious to health  by   means   of   one   or   more   of   the   following  operations,   namely:­­  

(a) adding any article or substance to the food;  

(b) using any article or substance as an ingredient  in   the   preparation   of   the   food;  

(c) abstracting any constituents from the food; or 

(d)   subjecting   the   food   to   any   other   process   or  treatment;  

with the knowledge that it may be sold or offered  for   sale   or   distributed   for   human   consumption.  

(2)   In   determining  whether  any  food  is   unsafe   or   injurious   to   health,   regard   shall   be   had   to­­  

(a) (i) the normal conditions of use of the food by  the   consumer   and   its   handling   at   each   stage   of  production,   processing   and   distribution,  

(ii)   the   information   provided   to   the   consumer,  including   information   on   the   label,   or   other  information   generally   available   to   the   consumer  concerning the avoidance of specific adverse health  effects from a particular food or category of foods  not only to the probable, immediate or short­ term  or long ­term effects of that food on the health of  a   person   consuming   it,   but   also   on   subsequent  generations;  

(iii)   to   the   probable   cumulative   toxic   effects;  

(iv)   to   the   particular   health   sensitivities   of   a  specific   category   of   consumers   where   the   food   is  intended   for   that   category   of   consumers;   and  

(v) also to the probable cumulative effect of food  of substantially the same composition on the health  of a person consuming it in ordinary quantities;  

(b)   the   fact   where   the   quality   or   purity   of   the   article, being primary food, has fallen below the  specified standard or its constituents are present  in   quantities   not   within   the   specified   limits   of  variability, in either case, solely due to natural  causes and beyond the control of human agency, then  such article shall not be deemed to be unsafe or   sub­standard or food containing extraneous matter. 

Explanation   .­­For   the   purposes   of   this   section,  “injury”,   includes   any   impairment,   whether  permanent or  temporary,  and “injurious  to health”  shall   be   construed   accordingly.  

49. General provisions relating to penalty ­ While  adjudging   the   quantum   of   penalty   under   this  Chapter, the Adjudicating Officer or the Tribunal,  as the case may be, shall have due regard to the  following:­­  

(a)   the   amount   of   gain   or   unfair   advantage,  wherever   quantifiable,   made   as   a   result   of   the  contravention,  

(b) the amount of loss caused or likely to cause to  any   person   as   a   result   of   the   contravention,  

(c)   the   repetitive   nature   of   the   contravention,  

(d)   whether   the   contravention   is   without   his  knowledge,   and  

(e)   any   other   relevant   factor.  

50. Penalty for selling food not of the nature or  substance   or   quality   demanded   ­   Any   person   who  sells to the purchaser’s prejudice any food which  is   not   in  compliance  with   the   provisions  of   this   Act or the regulations made thereunder, or of the  nature   or   substance   or   quality   demanded   by   the  purchaser,   shall   be   liable   to   a   penalty   not  exceeding   two   lakh   rupees.  

Provided that the persons covered under sub­section  (2) of section 31, shall for such non­compliance be  liable   to   a   penalty   not   exceeding   twenty   five  thousand   rupees.  

51. Penalty for sub­standard food ­ Any person who  whether by himself or by any other person on his   behalf manufactures for sale or stores or sells or  distributes   or   imports   any   article   of   food   for  human consumption which is sub standard, shall be  liable to a penalty which may extend to five lakh 

52.   Penalty  for   misbranded  food  ­   (1)   Any   person  who whether by himself or by any other person  on   his behalf manufactures for sale or stores or sells  or distributes or imports any article of food for  human   consumption   which   is   misbranded,   shall   be  liable to a penalty  which may extend  to three lakh  rupees.  

(2) The Adjudicating Officer may issue a direction  to the person found guilty of an offence under this  section,   for   taking   corrective   action   to   rectify  the   mistake   or   such   article   of   food   shall   be  destroyed.  

53. Penalty for misleading advertisement ­ (1 ) Any  person   who   publishes,   or   is   a   party   to   the  publication   of   an   advertisement,   which­­  

(a)   falsely   describes   any   food;   or  

(b)   is   likely   to   mislead   as   to   the   nature   or   substance   or   quality   of   any   food   or   gives   false  guarantee,   shall be liable to a penalty which may extend to   ten   lakh   rupees.  

(2)   In   any   proceeding   the   fact   that   a   label   or  advertisement   relating   to   any   article   of   food   in  respect   of   which   the   contravention   is   alleged   to  have been committed contained an accurate statement  of the composition of the food shall not preclude  the court from finding that the contravention was  committed.  

54. Penalty for food containing extraneous matter ­   Any   person   whether   by   himself   or   by   any   other  person   on   his   behalf   manufactures   for   sale   or  stores   or   sells   or   distributes   or   imports   any  article   of   food   for   human   consumption   containing  extraneous   matter,   shall   be   liable   to   a   penalty  which   may   extend   to   one   lakh   rupees.  

55.   Penalty   for   failure   to   comply   with   the  directions   of   Food   Safety   Officer   ­   If   a   food  business   operator   or   importer   without   reasonable  ground,   fails   to   comply   with   the   requirements   of  this   Act   or   the   rules   or   regulations   or   orders  issued thereunder, as directed by the Food Safety  Officer , he shall be liable to a penalty which may  extend   to   two   lakh   rupees.  

56. Penalty for unhygienic or unsanitary processing  or manufacturing of food ­ Any person who, whether  by himself or by any other person on his behalf,   manufactures or processes any article of food for  human   consumption   under   unhygienic   or   unsanitary  conditions, shall be liable to a penalty which may  extend   to   one   lakh   rupees.  

57. Penalty for processing adulterant ­ (1) Subject  to   the   provisions  of   this   chapter,  if   any   person  who whether by himself or by any other person on   his   behalf,   imports   or   manufactures   for   sale,   or  stores, sells or distribute any adulterant shall be  liable   ­­  

(i)   where   such   adulterant   is   not   injurious   to  health, to a penalty not exceeding two lakh rupees; 

(ii) where such adulterant is injurious to health,  to   a   penalty   not   exceeding   ten   lakh   rupees.  

(2)   In   a   proceeding   under   sub­section   (1   ),   it  shall not be a defence that the accused was holding  such   adulterant   on   behalf   of   any   other   person.  

58. Penalty for contravention for which no specific  penalty   is   provided   ­   Whoever   contravenes   any  provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations  made thereunder, for the contravention of which no  penalty   has   been   separately   provided   in   this  Chapter,   shall   be   liable   to   a   penalty   which   may  extend   to   two   lakh   rupees.  

59.   Punishment  for  unsafe  food  ­   Any   person  who,   whether by himself or by any other person on his   behalf, manufactures for sale or stores or sells or  distributes   or   imports   any   article   of   food   for  human   consumption   which   is   unsafe,   shall   be  punishable,­­  

(i)where   such   failure   or   contravention   does   not  result   in   injury,   with   imprisonment   for   a   term  which may extend to six months and also with fine  which   may   extend   to   one   lakh   rupees;  

(ii)where such failure or contravention results in  a non­grievous injury, with imprisonment for a term  which   may   extend   to   one   year   and   also   with   fine  which   may   extend   to   three   lakh   rupees;  

(iii)where such failure or contravention results in  a   grievous   injury,   with   imprisonment   for   a   term  which may extend to six years and also with fine   which   may   extend   to   five   lakh   rupees;”  

Section 89 gives overriding effect of the Act over  the other food related laws and reads as under:­   “89.Overriding   effect   of   this   Act   over   all   other  food   related   laws   ­   The   provisions   of   this   Act  shall   have   effect   notwithstanding   anything  inconsistent  therewith  contained in  any other law  for the time being in force or in any instrument   having effect by virtue of any law other than this  Act.”  

Section 97 of the Act seeks to repeal the enactment  and   orders   specified   in   the   Second   Schedule  immediately with effect from the date on which the  Act   is   enacted   and   comes   into   force.   It   further  provides   that   if   there   is   any   other   law   for   the  time being in force in any State, corresponding to  the Act, the same shall, upon the commencement of  the   Act,   stand   repealed   and   in   such   case,   the  provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  1897   shall   apply.  

“97. Repeal and savings ­ (1) With effect from such  date as the Central Government may appoint in this  behalf, the enactment and orders specified in the  Second   Schedule   shall   stand   repealed:  

Provided   that   such   repeal   shall   not   affect   :­­  

(i)the   previous   operations   of   the   enactment   and  orders   under   repeal   or   anything   duly   done   or  suffered   thereunder;   or  

(ii)any   right,   privilege,   obligation   or   liability  acquired,   accrued   or   incurred   under   any   of   the  enactment   orders   under   repeal;   or  

(iii)any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred  in   respect   of   any   offences   committed   against   the  enactment   and   orders   under   repeal   ;   or  

(iv)any investigation or remedy in respect of any  such   penalty,   forfeiture   or   punishment,   and   any   such   investigation,   legal   proceedings   or  remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and  any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be  imposed,   as   if   this   Act   had   not   been   passed:  

(2) If there is any other law for the time being in   force in any State, corresponding to this Act, the  same shall upon the commencement of this Act, stand  repealed   and   in   such   case,   the   provisions   of  section  6   of   the  General  Clauses  Act,   1897   shall  apply as if such provisions of the State law had   been   repealed.  

(3)   Notwithstanding   the   repeal   of   the   aforesaid  enactment and orders the licences  issued under any   such enactment or order , which are in force on the  date of commencement   of this Act, shall continue to  be in force till the date of their expiry for all  purposes,   as   if   they   had   been   issued   under   the  provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations  made   thereunder.  

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other  law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   no   court   shall  take   cognizance   of   an   offence   under   the   repealed  Act or orders  after the expiry of a period of three  years   from   the   date   of   the   commencement   of   this  Act.”  

Thus, after the aforesaid notification the FSSA now  stands as the only law relating to deal with the   adulteration of food. Various provisions of the Act  were notified on different dates over a period of  time.  

The   State   Government   has   issued   the   G.O.   Dated  11.5.2010   directing   all   Divisional   Commissioners,  District Magistrates, Deputy Inspector Generals of  Police,   Senior   Superintendent   of   Police   and  Superintendents   of   Police   to   lodge   FIR   under  Section 272/273 IPC in case of adulteration of any  article   of   food   or   drink.   The   grievance   of   the  petitioners   that   pursuant   to   the   said   Government  order,   the   authorities   are   invoking   Sections  272/273   IPC   without   following   or   applying   the  provisions   of   FSSA.   Sections   272   and   Section   273  read   as   under:  

“272.Adulteration   of   food   or   drink   intended   for  sale:­ Whoever adulterates any article of food or  drink, so as to make such article noxious as food  or drink, intending to sell such article as food or  drink,   or   knowing   it   to   be   likely   that   the   same  will be sold as food or drink, shall be punished   with imprisonment of either description for a term  which   may   extended   to   six   months,   or   with   fine,  which  may   extend  to   one   thousand  rupees,  or   with   both.  

272. Sale of noxious food or drink:­ Whoever sells,  or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink,   any article which has been rendered or has become  noxious or is in a state unfit for food or drink,  knowing or having reason to believe that the same  is   noxious,   or   is   in   a   state   unfit   for   food   or  drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the  same is noxious as food or drink, shall be punished  with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which  may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” 

Section   272   IPC,   reproduced   hereinabove,   is  attracted when a person adulterates an article of  food with the intention to sell such an article or  knowing that it is likely that the article will be  sold as food or drink. In the instant case, there  is   no   allegation  in   the   FIR  that  the  petitioner­ company   or   its   employees   or   agents   had   kept   its  products   with   the   intention   to   sell   the   same   or  knowing that the products are likely to be sold as  food   or   drink   or   that   the   said   products   were  exposed or offered for sale. The definite stand of  the   company  was   the   articles  seized  were  kept   in   the godown where even a board “not for sale” was   also   hanging   at   the   time   when   the   search   was  conducted.  

At   this   juncture  it   would   be   relevant  to   mention  that the Indian Penal Code is a general Penal Code  for India. Section 2 IPC deals with the punishment  of   offences   committed   within   India   and   provides  that   every   person   shall   be   liable   to   punishment  under this Code and not otherwise for every act or  omission   contrary   to   the   provisions   thereof,   of  which  he   shall   be   guilty  within  India.   Section  5  IPC says that nothing in the Code shall affect any  provisions of any Special or local law and it reads  as   under:­   “5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act ­  Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of  any   Act   for   punishing   mutiny   and   desertion   of  officers,   soldiers,   sailors   or   airmen   in   the  service   of   the   Government   of   India   or   the  provisions   of   any   special   or   local   law.”  

Thus, from perusal of provisions of Section 5 IPC,  one   thing   is   crystal   clear   that   nothing   in   the  Penal   Code   shall   affect   any   provisions   of   any  Special Act and when for any act or omission in a  particular   subject,   a   special   set   of   rules   have  been framed, in that situation, the provisions of  the IPC have to be ignored or overlooked. In the   cases   at   hand   FIRs   have   been   registered   under  sections 272 and 273 IPC pursuant to the impugned  Government   Order   although   adulteration   of   Food  Stuff   is   covered   by   a   Special   Act   i.e.   The   Food  Safety   and   Standards   Act,   2006.  

It is pertinent to add that the PFA Act was enacted  for the prevention of adulteration of food, being a  special  Act,  it   eclipsed  sections  272  and  273   of   IPC. In other words, the said Act made  sections 272  and   273   of   IPC   redundant   as   punishment   provided  under the PFA Act  was much more stringent than what  was   provided   under   Sections   272   and   273   IPC.  

In   North   East   Pure   Drinks   Pvt   Ltd   vs.   State   of  Assam(Criminal Petition No. 300 of 2007),  on which  reliance   has   been   placed   by   the   petitioners’  Counsel, the Gauhati High Court  after examining the  gravity of the charge under Section 272 IPC held as  under:­   “Thus apart, even if one presumes that the seized  products   had   been   rendered   noxious   or   were   unfit  for human consumption, the fact remains that mere  possession or storage of such articles of food or  drink would not be an offence under section 273 IPC  unless one, who is in possession of such an article  of   food   or   drink,   sells   the   same   or   offers   or  exposes the same for sale or knows or has reason to  believe that such article of food or drink would be  sold   or   offered   or   would   be   exposed   for   sale.”  

In Jatinder Kumar Jain vs. State of Punjab; 2008(2)  FAC 437, on which reliance has been placed by the  Counsel for the petitioners, the Punjab and Haryana  High   Court   held   in   paragraph   3   as   under:­   “Ground for quashing, put forward on behalf of the  petitioner,   is   that   for   the   offence   of   food  adulteration,   procedure   is   prescribed   under  sections   10   and   11   of   the   PFA   Act,   for   taking   a  sample   and   for   getting   the   same   tested.   Separate  procedure   for   trial   has   also   been   prescribed.   In  these   circumstances,   registering   of   FIR   without  following   the   procedure   laid   down   in   the   special  statute   is   not   permissible   in   law.”  

The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of   Jatinder   Kumar   Jain   held   that   registering   of   FIR  without   following   the   procedure   laid   down   in   the  special   statute   is   not   permissible   in   law.   In  Jeewan Kumar Raut [supra] the question before the  Apex   Court   was   regarding   applicability   of   sub­ section(2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 in a case where cognizance has been  taken   under   Section   22   of   the   Transplantation   of  Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO) on a complaint filed  by   the   CBI.   The   Apex   Court   after   examining   the  matter in detail hold that TOHO being a special Act  and   the   matter   relating   to   dealing   with   offences  thereunder having been regulated by reason of the  provisions thereof, there cannot be any manner of   doubt whatsoever that the same shall prevail over  the   provisions   of   the   Code.   It   also   held   in  unequivocal   terms   that   if   a   Special   statute   lays  down   procedures,   the   ones   laid   down   under   the  general statutes shall not be followed. In the case  of   Jamiruddin   Ansari   [supra],   the   Apex   Court  reiterated   its   earlier   view   and   held   that  provisions of MCOCA would have an overriding effect  over the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.  For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that  the   Union   of   India   is   not   a   necessary   party   and  that   too   when   there   is   no   ambiguity   in   the  notification   dated   29th   July,   2010.  

As regard the assertion of the State Counsel that  the   recovered   article   i.e.   cold   drink   is   not   a  “Food” and as such the provisions of FSSA would not  be applicable, we would like first to recapitulate  the   definition   of   word   “Food”   and   “substance”   as  defined under Section 3 of the Act,  which reads as  under:­   “(j) “food” means any substance, whether processed,  partially   processed   or   unprocessed,   which   is  intended for human consumption and includes primary  food,   to   the   extent   defined   in   clause   (ZK)  genetically   modified   or   engineered   food   or   food  containing such ingredients, infant food, packaged  drinking water, alcoholic  drink, chewing gum, and  any substance, including water used into the food  during   its   manufacture,   preparation   or   treatment  but does not include any animal feed, live animals  unless they are prepared  or processed for placing  on the market for human consumption, plants prior  to   harvesting,   drugs   and   medicinal   products,  cosmetics,   narcotic   or   psychotropic   substances:  

Provided that  the Central  Government  may declare,  by notification in the Official Gazette, any other  article as food for the purposes of this Act having  regards to its use, nature, substance or quality;”  “(zw) substance” includes any natural or artificial  substance or other matter, whether it is in a solid  state or in liquid form or in the form of gas or  vapour;  

It is not the case of the State Counsel that the  carbonated drinks or juice based beverages are not  intended for human consumption or that they are not  substances for the purposes of Section 3 (zw). In  PFA Act, standards were prescribed for various food  articles   in   the   Appendix   B.   In   Appendix­B,  carbonated   water   is   defined   in   Entry   A.01.01.   By  virtue of Section 98, the rules including Appendix  B has been temporarily transported to FSSA till the  regulations under the FSSA are notified. Therefore,  we are unable to agree with the arguments advanced  on behalf of the State that the provisions of the  FSSA   are   not   applicable   in   the   instant   case.  

In   view   of   the   aforesaid   crystal   clear   legal  proposition   and   particular   provisions   under   the  FSSA   we   are   in   agreement   with   the   arguments  advanced   by   the   petitioner’s   Counsel   that   for  adulteration  of food or  misbranding,  after coming  into   force   of   the   provisions   of   FSSA   vide  notification dated 29th July, 2010, the authorities  can   take   action   only   under   the   FSSA   as   it  postulates   an   over   riding   effects   over   all   other  food related laws including the  PFA Act. In view of  the   specific   provisions   under   the   FSSA,   the  offences relating to  adulteration of food  that are  governed under the FSSA after July 29,2010 are to  be treated as  per the procedures to be followed for  drawing   and   analysis   of   samples   as   have   been  provided   for.   The   provisions   of   penalties   and  prosecution   have   also   been   provided   therein.  Therefore, before launching any prosecution against  an   alleged   offence   of   food   adulteration,   it   is  necessary for  the concerned authorities to follow  the   mandatory   requirements   as   provided   under  Sections 41 and 42 of the FSSA and, therefore, the  police   have   no   authority   or   jurisdiction   to  investigate   the   matter   under   FSSA.   Section   42  empowers the Food Safety Officer  for inspection of  food business, drawing samples and sending them to  Food Analyst for analysis.  The Designated Officer,  after scrutiny of the report of Food Analyst shall  decide   as   to   whether   the   contravention   is  punishable   with   imprisonment   or   fine   only   and   in  the   case   of   contravention   punishable   with  imprisonment, he shall send his recommendations to  the   Commissioner   of   Food   Safety   for   sanctioning  prosecution.   Therefore,   invoking   Sections   272   and  273 of the Indian Penal Code in the matter relating  to   adulteration   of   food   pursuant   to   the   impugned  government order is wholly unjustified and non est.  Furthermore,   it   appears   that   the   impugned  Government   Order   has   been   issued   without  application of proper mind and examining the matter  minutely   and   thus   the   State   Government   travelled  beyond the jurisdiction.”

14. Almost   in   line   with   the   decision   of   this  Court   in   the   case   of  Shambhu   Dayal   Agrawal  (supra)  a   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   Punjab  HC-NIC Page 34 of 74 Created On Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017 and Haryana High Court in the case of Inderpal  and   another   v.   State   of   Haryana,  CRM.   M.  No.11688 of 2011 decided on 18th December, 2013  read as under:­ “This   petition   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.   has  been   filed   forquashing   of   FIR   No.132   dated  20.6.2010 registered under Sections272, 420, 34  IPC   at   Police   Station,   Kalanaur,   District  Rohtak   and   allsubsequent   proceedings   arising  out of the said FIR.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Apart   from   the   aforesaid   FIR,   criminal  complaint   No.336dated   30.7.2010   under   Sections  7 and 16 of The Prevention of Food Adulteration  Act,   1954   has   been   filed   (Annexure   P­3).   The  Food Inspector had taken in his possession eight  plastic   drums   containing about   150   litres   of  mixed   milk.   After   making   necessary  samples,sample   was   sent   to   the   Public   Analyst  for  analysis,  who  annexed  his  report  that  the  sample contains 4.0% of Milk Fat and 5.88% of  Milk   solids   not   fat   against   the   minimum  prescribed limit of 4.5% and 8.5% respectively.  The   sample   was   found   to   be   adulterated.   The  allegations in the FIR are identical but after  getting   the   public   analyst’s   report,   challan  was   presented   and   charges   have   been   framed  under   Sections   272/273   and   420   IPC   and   the  petitioner is facing trial in the FIR as well  as   the   criminal   complaint.   The   issue   whether  police   can   register   an   FIR   for   offence  punishable   under   Sections   420/269/270/271   IPC  had come up for consideration before this Court  in the case of  Shiv Kumar Vs. State of Punjab  2009(1) FAC 238. In that case, ASI Bhagwan Dass  on a secret information went to the shop of the   accused and purchased Paneer and the Paneer was  sent for public analysis and it was found to be   adulterated. FIR was registered under Sections  420/269/270/271 Indina Penal Code and merely a  complaint No.59 dated 3.5.2008 under Section 16  of Prevention of Food and Adulteration Act was  filed by the Food Inspector. While quashing the  FIR, the Court has observed that it was not a   case that the Paneer was fake or there was any  intention   on   the   part   of   the   accused   for  cheating   public.   The   Paneer   was   found   to   be   adulterated   and   therefore,   complaint   under  Section   16   of   Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration  Act could be filed and FIR cannot be lodged. In   paragraph 8 the Court observed as under:

“So   far  as  the  fact   that   Paneer   is   fake  one,   there is no report to this effect on the file.  The Patna High Court in the authority in case  Satish Mishra Versus State of Bihar and others,  2007(1) FAC 393  has held that when there is a   special   statute   under   the   Prevention   ;of   Food  Adulteration Act, 1954 then by adding sections  of IPC, FIR cannot be launched. Keeping in view  the fact that Paneer was not found to be fake   but   was   found   to   be   not   conforming   to   the   prescribed standard, the proceedings under the  Criminal   Act   cannot   continue.   So,   FIR   No.305  dated   6.11.2007   under   Sections   420/269/270/271  IPC, Police   Station,   City   Samana   and   further  proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.”

This  proposition  of  law  could  not  be  disputed  by   the   learned   State   counsel,   however,   he  informs the Court that the petitioner has been  appearing   regularly   before   the   trial   Court   in  FIR   No.132   dated   20.6.2010   registered   under  Sections 272, 420, 34 Indina Penal Code but in  the   complaint   case   he   has   been   declared  proclaimed offender on 30.11.2012.

Keeping   in   view   the   fact   that   for   selling  substandard   milk,   the   petitioner   was   not  required   to   face   two   criminal   proceedings,  therefore,   FIR   No.132   dated   20.6.2010  registered  under  Sections  272,  420,  34  IPC  at  Police   Station,   Kalanaur,   District   Rohtak   is  being   quashed   qua   the   petitioners.   The  petitioner shall be at liberty to appear before  the trial Court within one month and he shall  be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to  the satisfaction of trial court.”

15. In the case of  Md. Mahmood and Others v.  The   State   of   A.P.,   2006   CRI   L.J.   3470,  N.V.  RAMANA,   J.   (as   has   lordship   then   was)  considered   almost   an   identical   issue.   I   may  quote the relevant observations:­”6.   Under   the   scheme   of   the   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act,   1954,   the   power   to   inspect,  seize,   arrest   and   investigate   the   cases   falling  under   the   prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act,  1954, is vested exclusively in the Food Inspector,  appointed for a local area, in whose jurisdiction  the offence is committed. The powers of the Food  Inspector,   appointed   under   Section   9,   are  enumerated in Section 10 of the Prevention of Food  Adulteration Act,  1954, which  inter alia  include  to take samples of any article of food from any   person   selling   article,   conveying,   delivering   or  preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser  or   consignee,   to   send   such   sample   for   public  analyst   for   the   local   area   within   which   such  sample has been taken with the previous approval  of   the   local   (health)   authority   having  jurisdiction in the local area councerned or with  the   previous   approval   of   the   Food  (Health)Authority,   to   prohibit   the   sale   of   any  article of food in the interest of public health.

7.   In   the   interest   of   public   health,   the  Government vide orders issued in G.O. Ms. No.44,  Health,   Medical   and   Family   Welfare   (LT)  Department,   dated   19­2­2002,   has   prohibited   the  sale of pan masala with any emblem of Gutkha. For   enforcement   of   the   prohibition   of   Gutkha   in   the  State   of   Andhra   Pradesh,   the   Directorate   of  Institute   of   Preventive   Medicine,   Public   Health  Labs   and   Food   (Health)   Administration.   Andhra  Pradesh, Hyderabad, has issued  Circular Memorandum  No.4709/F1/2001,   dated   20­2­2002,   to   the   effect  that the Food (Health) Administration, enforcement  officials shall conduct raids with the support of  the   Police   and   officials   of   Vigilance   and  Enforcement   Department   and   seize   such   products  from   retail   and   wholesale   outlets   and  manufacturing units in Andra Pradesh.

8. Gutkha being a food item, under the provisions  of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954,  it is only the Food Inspector, who is empowered to  seize, arrest and investigate the case. The sale  of Gutkha in the State of Andhra Pradesh has been   porhibited   by   the   Government.   As   per   the   orders  issued   by   the   Directorate   of   Institute   of  Preventive Medicine,  Public Health Labs and  Food  (Health)   Administration,   Andhra   Pradesh,  Hyderabad,   in   Circular   Memorandum,   dated   20­2­ 2002,   the   raids   in   relation   to   sale   of   Gutkha,  shall   be   conducted   by   the   Food   (Health)  Administration   Enforcement   Officials   with   the  support   of   the   Police   and   Officials   of   the  Vigilance   and   Enforcement   Department   and   seize  such   products   from   retail   and   wholesale   outlets  and manufacturing units in Andhra Pradesh. In the  instant case, except the local police, none of the  Enforcement   Officials   from   the   Food   (Health)  Administration,   were   involved   in   the   seizure,  arrest and investigation of the case.

9. Having regard to the fact that the Prevention  of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 vests the power to  seize, arrest and investigate the case in the Food  Inspector,   and   having   regard   to   the   Circular  Memorandum, which requires conducting of raids by  the   Food(Health)   Adminstration   Enforcement  Officials, for enforcing the ban on Gutkha, with  the support of Police and Officials of Vigilance  and Enforcement Department, the entire exercise of  seizure   of   Gutkha,   arrest   of   accused   and  investigation of case, done by the local police,  is   without   jurisdiction   and   the   proceedings  initiated in pursuance thereof on the file of VI  Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C. No.677  of 2002 against the petitioners, are liable to be  quashed.”

16. The learned Single Judge of the Patna High  Court in the case of Satish Mishra v. State of  Bihar  and   others,   Cri.   W.P.C.   No.829   of   2005  dealt with the same issue like one on hand. I  may   quote   the   observations   of   the   learned  Single Judge as under:­ “3.   On   behalf   of   the   petitioner   it   is   submitted  that he was manufacturing protein food supplements  under   licence   duly   issued   by   the   Food   Controller  under   the   Provisions   of   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration Act.  His premises were unauthorisedly  and   illegally   searched   by   the   Sub­ Inspector   of  Police, Sultanganj Police Station, which led to the  institution  of  the  present  case  on  the  allegation  that   the   petitioner   was   found   manufacturing   drugs  without proper licence and/ or authorisation. As the  petitioner   was   manufacturing   food   articles   for  which   they   had   licence,   it   was   alleged   that  provisions   of   Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act  was also violated.

4.   As   the   petitioner   had   intended   to   cheat   or   mislead   the   people   various   provisions   of   Indian  Penal   Code   were   added,   thus   the   police   usurped  jurisdiction   to   lodge   an   FIR   and   investigate   the   case. It is the correctness of this action of the   police that is in question.

5.   Having   heard   counsel   for   the   parties;   in   my  view,   Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act   is   a  complete Code in itself with regard to manufacture,  sale of food articles and  contravention in respect  thereof. It has its own set of authorities, which   are   authorised   to   conduct   investigation,   search,  seizure   and/or   launch   prosecution   in   respect  thereof including  enquiry into the matter. Same is  the provision of Drugs and Cosmetic Act. Both are   special statutes  making out special statues making  out special  offence  and  providing  for  its  enquiry  and  prosecution.

6.   In   that   view   of   the   matter,   in   view   of   the   provision   of   Section   4((2)   Cr.P.C.,   the   procedure  as prescribed in these special statute will have to  be   followed   in   derogation   to   the   procedure,   as  prescribed   under   Cr.P.C.   Special   authorities   have  been   conferred   on   special   officers   under   the   two   acts,   which   authorities   are   not   on   the   police  officer. The action of the police is wholly without  jurisdiction,  in  all  aspect  of  the  matter.  Merely  by   writing   Section   420   and   other   Sections   of   IPC  the police cannot make out an offence where there   is   none,   in   fact,  in   terms   of   those   sections  and  intendment   to   cheat   and   intendment   to   commit  criminal   breach   of   trust   is   not   enough   to   be   an   offence   under   IPC   and   preparation   to   commit   an  attempt   to   make   offence   is   not   punishable   under  IPC.

7. In the case of Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab   the Apex Court has held that as a matter of law a   preparation for committing an offence is different  from attempt to commit an offence.

8. Considering all aspect of the matter I find that  if   what   the   police   alleges   is   violation   of   Drugs  and   Cosmetic   Act,   then   it   is   only   Inspector   of  Drugs   who   had   the   authority   to   inspect,   search,  seizure   or   institution   of   prosecution.   If   they  allege   that   the   provision   of   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act   is   violated   then   it   was   the  authority of the Food Inspector alone and not the   police   officer   to   inspect,   seizure   or   ceased.   So   far as the offences alleged under IPC are concerned  none is made out on the facts of the case.

9.   In   this   connection   I   may   refer   to   an   earlier   judgment   of   this   court   in   the   case   of   Hindustan  Lever Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. which has been   followed in  subsequent  decision  by this Court. 

10.   In   that   view   of   the   matter,   the   present  prosecution   as   initiated   on   the   basis   of   the   FIR  aforesaid   and   all   subsequent   acts   thereunder   are  held   to   be   wholly   without   jurisdiction   and   are  quashed.”

17. Let   me   at   this   stage   look   into   the  provisions   of   the   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act,   1954   the   statement   of  objects and reasons reads as under:­ “Laws existed in a nuber of States in India   for the prevention of adulteration of food­ stuffs,   but   they   lacked   uniformity   having   been   passed   at   different   times   without   mutual consultation  between States. The need   for   Central   legislation   for   the   whole   country in this  matter has  been felt since   1937   when   a   Committee   appointed   by   the   Central Advisory Board of Health  recommended   this step. ‘Adulteration of food­stuffs and   other   goods’   is   now   included   in   the   Concurrent List (III) in the Constitution of  India.   It   has,   therefore,   become   possible   for the Central Government to enact an all  India legislation on this subject. The bill   replaces   all   local   food   adulteration   laws   where they exist and also applies to those   States where there are no local laws on the   subject. Among others, it provides for ­ 

(i) a Central Food Laboratory to which food   samples can be referred to for final opinion   in disputed cases (clause 4), 

(ii) a Central Committee for Food Standards   consisting of representatives of Central and   State   Government   to   advise   on   matters   arising  from   the   administration  of   the   Act   (clause 3), and

(iii) the vesting in the Central Government   of the rule making power regarding standards   of   quality   for   the   articles   of   food   and  certain other matters (clause 22).”

18. Section   20   provides   for   cognizance   of  trial of offences. It reads as under:­ “(1)   No   prosecution   for   an   offence   under   this Act, not being an offence under Section   14   or   section   14A     shall   be   instituted   except   by,   or   with   the   written   consent   of,   the   Central   Government   or   the   State   Government   or   a   person   authorized   in   this   behalf, by general or special order, by the   Central Government or the State Government.  Provided   that   a   prosecution   for   an   offence   under   this   Act   may   be   instituted   by   a   purchaser or recognized consumer association   referred   to   in   section   12,   if   he   or   it  produces   in   court   a   copy   of   the   report   of   the public analyst along­with the complaint.  

(2)   No   court   inferior   to   that   of   a   Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   a   Judicial   Magistrate of the first class shall try any   offence under this Act. 

(3)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973,   an   offence   punishable   under   sub­section   (1AA)   of   section   16   shall   be   cognizable   and   non­ bailable.”

19. Unlike   Section   89   of   the   Food   Safety   and  Standards   Act,   2006   there   is   no   provision   in  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954  given an overriding effect over all other food  related laws. 

20. At   this   stage,   let   me   now   look   into   the  decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Abdul Khader (supra). The Kerala High Court  was   dealing   with   a   matter   arising   from   the  Food   Safety   and   Standards   Act.   The   Court   was  called   upon   to   decide   almost   identical   issue  like   the   one   on   hand.   In   the   said   case,   the  accused   persons   were   charged   for   the   offence  punishable   under   Sections   273,   328   read   with  Section 34 of the IPC and  Section 59(iii) of  the Food Safety and Standards Act. 

21. The   accused   therein   were   running   a  restaurant   by   name   “Salwa   Cafe”.   The  allegation   was   that   on   10.07.2012   the   second  accused   prepared   the   food   article   by   name  “Shavarma”, which was injurious to health and  that   was   sold   to   several   persons,   who  developed   complications   and   that,   around   10  persons   had   to   be   admitted   in   the   different  hospitals   in   Thiruvananthapuram.   It   was  alleged   that   a   person   by   name   Sachin   Mathew  Roy, aged 21 years also purchased and consumed  ‘Shavarma’ from the restaurant of the accused  persons   and   he   also   developed   serious   gastro  problem,   which   resulted   in   his   death   at  Bangalore. 

22. The   Police   registered   the   offence  accordingly.   It   was   argued   on   behalf   of   the  HC accused persons therein that after the coming  into force the Food Safety and Standards Act,  the   general   provisions   in   the   IPC   regarding  the same subject matter is impliedly repealed  and they cannot be dealt with under both the  enactment.   It   was   also   argued   that   different  procedure   and   different   punishment   have   been  provided   under   the   Act,   2006   and   severe  punishment   has   been   provided   for   selling  unsafe food causing death and the Act 2006 had  repealed   the   prevention   of   Food   Adulteration  Act,   1954   and   taken   care   of   all   type   of  offences   relating   to   the   sale   of   food   and  consequences and ensued on account of sale of  such   food.   It   was   argued   that   under   such  circumstances   the   accused   persons   could   not  have   been   proceeded   against   under   two  enactments and accordingly it was prayed that  the proceedings be quashed.

23. The   learned   single   Judge   while   rejecting  such arguments observed and held as under:­ “14. Section 3(zz) of the Act defines “unsafe food”   which reads as follows:

Section   3(zz)   “Unsafe   food”   means   an   article   of  food   whose   nature,   substance   or   quality   is   so  affected as to render it injurious to health:

(i) by the article  itself, or its package thereof,  which  is  composed,  whether                wholly  or   in  HC-part, of poisonous or deleterious substances; or

(ii) by the article consisting, wholly or n part,  of   any   filthy,   putrid,   rotten,   decomposed   or  diseased   animal   substance   or   vegetable   substance;  or

(iii) by virtue of its unhygienic processing or the  presence in that article of any harmful substance;  or

(iv) by the substitution of any inferior or cheaper  substance whether wholly or in part; or

(v) by addition of a substance directly or as an   ingredient which is not permitted; or

(vi) by the    abstraction,    wholly or in part,  of any of its constituents; or

(vii) by the article being so coloured, flavoured  or  coated,  powdered  or   polished,  as   to  damage  or   conceal the article or to     make it appear better  or of greater value than it really is; or

(viii) by the presence of any colouring matter or  preservatives other than that specified in respect  thereof; or

(ix)   by   the   article   having   been   infected   or  infested with worms, weevils or insects; or

(x) by virtue of its being prepared, packed or kept  under insanitary conditions; or

(xi)by   virtue   of   its   being   mis­branded   or   sub­ standard or food containing extraneous matter; or

(xii) by virtue of containing pesticides  and other  contaminants in excess of quantities specified by  regulations”.

15. Section 59 of the Act deals with punishment for  unsafe food, which reads as follows:

59.   Punishment   for   unsafe   food:­   Any   person  who, whether by himself or by any other person on  his behalf,    manufactures for sale or      stores  or   sells  or       distributes or imports    any   article of     food for human consumption which is   unsafe, shall be punishable:­

(i) where   such failure or contravention does not  result   in   injury,   with   imprisonment   for   a   term  which may extend to six months and also with fine  which may extend to one lakh rupees;

(ii) where such failure or contravention results in   a non­grievous injury, with imprisonment for a term   which may             extend to one year and also with   fine which may extend to three lakh rupees;

(iii)   where       such   failure   or   contravention  results in a grievous injury, with imprisonment for   a term which may extend to six years and  also   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   five   lakh  rupees;

(iv) where such failure or contravention results in   death, with imprisonment for a term which shall not  be less than seven years but which may extend to   imprisonment   for   life   and   also   with   fine   which  shall not be less than ten lakh rupees.

16. Section 89 of the Act giving overriding effect  of this Act over all other food related laws which  reads as follows:

Section 89 overriding effect of this Act over all  other   food   related   laws:­   The   provisions   of   this  Act shall have effect     notwithstanding   anything  inconsistent        therewith  contained  in  any  other   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   or   in   any   instrument having effect by virtue of any law other  than this Act.

17. Section 97 deals with Repeal and savings which  reads as follows:

97. Repeal and savings:­ (1) With effect from such  date as the Central Government may appoint in this  behalf, the enactment and orders specified in the  Second Schedule        shall stand repealed:

Provided that such repeal shall not affect:­

(i)   the   previous   operations   of   the   enactment   and  orders under repeal or anything        duly done or   suffered thereunder; or

(ii)   any   right,   privilege,   obligation         or  liability acquired,  accrued or  incurred under any  of the enactment or Orders under repeal; or

(iii)   any   penalty,   forfeiture   or   punishment  incurred   in   respect   of   any   offences   committed  against the enactment and Orders under repeal; or 

(iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any  such   penalty,   forfeiture   or   punishment,   and   any  such  investigation,  legal  proceedings  or  remedy may be instituted,     continued or  enforced   and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may  be imposed, as if this Act had not been passed:

(2) If there is any other law for the time being in   force in any State, corresponding to this Act, the  same shall upon the commencement of this Act, stand  repealed        and in such case, the provisions of   section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of  1897)   shall   apply   as   if   such   provisions   of   the  State law had been repealed.

(3)   Notwithstanding           the       repeal     of   the  aforesaid enactment and Orders, the licences issued  under   any   such   enactment   or   Order,   which   are   in  force on the date of             commencement of this  Act, shall continue to be in force till the date of  their expiry for all purposes,  as if they had been  issued       under the provisions of this       act or  the  rules or regulations made  thereunder.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other  law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   no   court   shall  take cognizance of any offence under the repealed  Act or Orders after the expiry of a period  of three  years   from   the   date   of   the   commencement   of   this  Act.”

18.   The   second   schedule   to   the   Act   shows   the  enactments   which   were   repealed   after   coming   into  force of this Act which do not include any of the  provisions   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   which   deals  with the acts covered under these provisions.

19.   Chapter   XIV   of   Indian   Penal   Code   deals   with  offences   affecting   the   public   health,   safety  convenience,   decency   and   morals   and   sections   272  and 273 deal with sale of adulterated food or drink  and noxious food or drink which read as follows:

Section   272:­   Adulteration   of   food   or   drink  intended for sale:­ Whoever adulterates any article  of   food   or   drink,   so   as   to   make   such   article   noxious  as   food  or  drink,  intending  to  sell  such   article as food or drink, or        knowing it to  be   likely   that   the   same   will   be   sold   as   rood   or  drink,   shall   be   punished   with   imprisonment   or  either description for a term which may extend to  six months, or        with fine which may extend to   one thousand rupees,  or with both.  Section 273: Sale of noxious food or drink:Whoever  sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or   drink, any article which has been rendered or has  become noxious, or        is in a state unfit for  food or drink, knowing or having reason to believe  that   the   same   is   noxious   as   food   or   drink,  shall   be   punished   with   imprisonment   of   either  description   for   a   term   which   may   extend   to   six  months,   or   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   one  thousand rupees, or with both.

20. Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code deals with  offences affecting the human body  and Section 304  deals   with   punishment   for   culpable   homicide   not  amounting to murder, which reads as follows:

304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting  to   murder:­   Whoever   commits               culpable  homicide  not amounting to murder         shall be   punished  with  [imprisonment for  life],  or  imprisonment of either       description for a term  which may extend to ten years, and shall also be   liable to fine, if the act by which the death is  caused is done with the intention of causing death,  or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to   cause   death,   or   with   imprisonment   of   either  description   for   a   term   which   may   extend   to   ten  years, or with fine, or with               both, if the   act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to  cause   death,   but   without   any   intention   to   cause  death,   or   to   cause   such   bodily   injury         as   is   likely to cause death.

21. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act deals with  the   effect   of   repeal   of   Act   making   textual  amendment   in   Act   or   Regulation   which   reads   as  follows:

6.Effect   of   repeal:­   Where   this   Act,   or   any  [Central   Act}   or   Regulation   made   after   the   commencement   of   this   Act   repeals   any   enactment  hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless  a   different   intention   appears,   the   repeal   shall  not­

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the  time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b)    affect   the previous      operation of any   enactment so   repealed or   anything     duly done   or suffered thereunder;or (c ) affect    any right, privilege, obligation or   liability   acquired,  accrued or incurred under any  enactment so repealed; or

(d)   affect   any   penalty,   forfeiture   or   punishment  incurred   in   respect   of   any   offence   committed  against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect  any investigation, legal proceeding or  remedy   in   respect   of   any   such   right,   privilege,  obligation,        liability,penalty, forfeiture or  punishment   as   aforesaid,   and   any   such  investigation,   legal   proceeding   or   remedy   may   be  instituted,   continued   or   enforced,   and   any   such  penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as   if   the   repealing   Act   or   Regulation   had   not   been  passed”

22. Section         26 of the        General Clauses  Act deals with provisions as to offences punishable  under   Section   of   two   or   more   enactments,   which  reads as follows:

26. Provision as to offences punishable under two  or   more   enactments:­   Where   an   act   or   omission  constitutes   an   offence   under   two   or   more  enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be  prosecuted and punished          under either or any  of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be  punished twice for the same offence.

It is clear from the above that             though  certain   provisions   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   and  Food Safety and Standards Act overlap on the same  subject,   it   will   have   to   be   considered   as   to  whether   a   person   committed   the   offence   can   be  proceeded against, if the act complained of may be  an   offence   under   two   enactments,   independently  will depend upon as to whether the offences alleged  are   distinct   and   different   or   the   same   and   by  virtue   of   the   special   Act   being   enacted   on   the  subject  matter whether general  provisions  will be  impliedly repealed etc and those things have to be  considered on facts of each case.

23. It is true that if there is any provision made  covering a particular offence in respect of which  there is a general law and a       special law was   enacted   subsequent   to   the   general   law,   then  normally the special law will prevail over the same  and       even   if           there   no         specific   exclusion,  if     from  the  circumstances,  it   can  be   revealed   that   it   is   impliedly   repealed,   then   the  provisions   in   the   special   law   will   prevail   over  that subject matter.

24.   In   the   unreported   decision   in   Writ   Petition  No.8254   (MB)   of   2010   M/s   Pepsico   India   Holdings  (Pvt)   Limited   and   another   v.   State   of   U.P   and  others, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,  Lucknow Bench considered the question as to whether   the provisions of the Food Safety Act has impliedly  repealed the offences under sections 272 and 273 of  the Indian Penal        Code    which   deals with   sale of adulterated food or drink or noxious food  or drink and held in the affirmative and held that  a person cannot be prosecuted under both enactments  separately   or   only   under   the  latter Act namely Food Safety and Standards Act.

25. In the decision reported in  Jeevan   Kumar   Raut   &   Anr.   v.   Central   Bureau   of  Investigation   (AIR   2009   SC   2763)   the   Hon’ble  Supreme Court has held that by virtue of section 22  of   Transplantation   of   Human   Organ   Act   where   a  particular   procedure   has   been   given   for   dealing  with   offences   under   that             Act,   the   general   provisions   regarding       the   investigation   as  provided   under   the  Code   of   Criminal   Procedure will not be applicable  as it will have a  overriding   effect   over   the   general   procedure  provided   under   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code  regarding   investigation.   In   paragraph  19 of the decision,  the Hon’ble Supreme Court has  observed as follows:

“19. Section    22 of TOHO prohibits        taking   of   cognizance   except   on   a   complaint   made   by   an  appropriate authority or the person who had made a   complaint   earlier                 to   it   as   laid   down  therein.         Respondent,   although   ,   has   all   the   powers of an investigating  agency,  it expressly has   been statutorily prohibited from filing a   police report.  It could file a complaint petition  only  as  an  appropriate  authority  so   as  to  comply   with   the   requirements   contained   in   Section   22   of  TOHO.   If   by   reason   of   the   provisions   of   TOHO,  filing of a police report by necessary implication  is necessarily forbidden, the question of   its submitting a report in terms of sub­section (2)  of Section 173 of the Code did not and could not  arise. In other words, if no police report could be  filed, sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the Code  was not attracted.”

26.   In   paragraph   29   of   the   same   judgment   it   has  been further observed as follows:

“In   this   case   however,   the   respondent   has   not specifically been empowered both under the  1946 Act   as also under the Code to carry out investigation  and file charge sheet as           is precluded from   doing   so   only   by   reason   of   section   22   of   Transplantation of Human Organs Act.  It is doubtful  as   to   whether   in   the   event   of     authorization   of  officer   of   the             department   to   carry   out  investigation   on   a   complaint   made   by   the   third  party  he  would  be  entitled  to  arrest  the  accused   and   carry   on   investigation   as   if   he   is   a   police  officer            he hope  that  parliament  would  take  appropriate   measure   to   suitably   amend   the   law   in  the near future”.

27. In the decision reported in Jamiruddin Ansari  v.   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   (2009   (6)   SCC 

316),   while   construing   the   provisions   of  Maharashtra   Control   of   Organised   Crime   Act,   1999  (hereinafter   referred   to   as   MCOCA),   the   Hon’ble  Supreme Court has held that:

“Although   the   special   judge   is   entitled   to   take  cognizance  of   the   offences  under   MCOCA   even   on   a   private  complaint,  but, after  due compliance  with  either of a private nature or on a police report.  Hence, on receipt of a private complaint, Special  Judge   has   to   forward   the   same   to   the   officer  indicated   in   section   23(1)(a)   to   have   an   inquiry  conducted   into   the   complaint   by   a   police   officer  mentioned   in   section   23(1)(b).   It   is   only  thereafter that Special Judge  can take cognizance  of   the   offence   complained   of,   if   sanction   is  accorded to the special court to cognizance of such  offence under section 23 (2). Special Judge cannot  invoke         provisions of section 156 (3) Cr.PC to  order a special inquiry on such private complaint  and   take   cognizance   thereupon,   without   traversing  the  route  indicated  in   S.23.  It  is  also   observed   therein   that   section   9             cannot   be   read   or   invoked   independent   of   S.23   and   both   these  provisions must be read harmoniously.

28. In the decision reported in State of M.P. v.   Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. and others (2003 (7)  SCC 389), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered  the effect of section 133 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure and the  provisions  of  Water (Prevention  and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Chapter 5 and  sections 32 and 33) and Air (Prevention and Control  of   Pollution)   Act,   1981   (Chapter   IV   and   sections  18,   20   &   22   A   and   considered   the   question   as   to  whether by virtue of the above provisions under the  above   said   Acts,   Section   133   of   the   Code   of  Criminal   Procedure   is   impliedly   repealed   and   the  Supreme Court has held that  as section 133  of the  Code  and the two acts were mutually exclusive and  there was no impediment to their existence side by  side   two   acts   did   not   impliedly   overrule   section  133 of the Code. While considering the provisions,  the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“There is     presumption       against       a     repeal   by   implication;   and   the   reason   of   this   rule   is  based   on   the   theory   that   the   legislature   while  enacting a law has                 complete knowledge of   the existing       laws on the same subject­matter,  and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing  provision, the intention is clear not to repeal the  existing legislation. When the new Act contains a  repealing section         mentioning the     Acts   which         expressly         repeals,         the   presumption    against   implied   repeal of other  laws is further   strengthened   on   the   principle   expressio  unius         (persone   vel           rei)   est   exclusio  alterius (The     express                 intention of one   person   or           thing   is   the         exclusion       of  another).   The   continuance   of   the   existing  legislation,   in                   the       absence   of   an  express   provision   of       repeal   by  implication lies on the party asserting the same.  The         presumption is, however, rebutted and  a         repeal   is                 inferred   by   necessary  implication  when  the   provisions  of                  the  later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to  the         provisions of the earlier Act that the   two cannot stand         together. But, if the two   can be read together and some         application   can   be   made   of   the   words   in   the   earlier   Act,   a  repeal will not be inferred.                

The necessary questions to be asked are:

(1)Whether there is direct conflict     between the  two provisions.

(2). Whether the legislature intended to lay down  an   exhaustive       Code           in     respect   of     the   subject ­matter replacing the earlier law.

(3)   Whether   the   two   laws   occupy   the   same   field.  When   the   court   applies   the   doctrine,   it   does   no  more   than   give   effect   to   the   intention   of   the  legislature by         examining the scope and the  object of the two enactments and by a comparison of  their provisions. The matter in each case is one of  the construction and comparison of         the two  statutes.   The   court   leans   against   implying   a  repeal.   To   determine   whether   a   later   statute  repeals by implication   an      earlier  statute,  it is necessary to         scrutinize the terms and   consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier  Act.         Until     this   is     done,   it   is   impossible   to   ascertain   whether   any   inconsistency  exists between the two enactments.”

29. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in  Deep   Chand   v.   State   of   U.P   (AIR   1959   SC   648)   considered the question of repugnance between two  statutes and how this will have to be considered as  follows:

“Repugnancy     between       two   statutes may be   ascertained   on   the   basis   of   the   following   three  principles:

(1)Whether there is direct   conflict  between the  two  provisions;

(2)Whether   Parliament   intended   to   lay   down   an  exhaustive   code   in   respect   of   the   subject­matter  replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (3)Whether the law made by Parliament and the law  made   by   the   State   Legislature   occupy   the   same  field.”

30.   The   same   view   has   been   reiterated   in   the  decision reported in Tansukh Rai Jain v. Nilratan  Prasad Shaw and others (AIR 1966 SC 1780). Further  in the  decision reported in Municipal Corporation  of   Delhi   v.   Shiv   Shanker   (AIR   Crl.M.C.No.1266   of  2013              1971 SC 815) while considering   the                              question as  to  whether  the  provisions   of   the   Essential   Commodities   Act   or  Fruit Products Order made thereunder can impliedly  repealed   Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act   and  observed as follows:

“The object and purpose of the Adulteration Act is  to  eliminate  the  danger  to  human  life  and  health   from the sale of unwholesome articles of food. The  Essential         Commodities Act on the other hand   has for its object the control of the production,  supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce  in, essential commodities. In spite         of this   difference       the         two   provisions   may   have  conterminous fields of operation. The provisions of  the Adulteration Act and of the Fruit     Order are  supplementary and cumulative in their operation and  they        can stand together. If the Adulteration  Act   or   Rules   impose   some   restrictions   on   the  manufacturer,   dealer   and   seller   of   vinegar   then  they have to comply with them irrespective of the  fact that the Fruit Order  imposes lesser number of  restrictions   in   respect   of   these   matters.   The  Parliament did not intend by enacting the Essential  Commodities   Act   or   the   Fruit   Order   to   impliedly  repeal the provisions of the Adulteration Act and  the Rules in         respect of the vinegar. Both  the statures can function with   full vigour   side   by side in their     own parallel channels. Even if  they happen to some extent to overlap, Section   26   of   the   General   Clauses   Act   fully  protects the guilty parties against double jeopardy  or   double   penalty.   Both   the   Adulteration   Act   and  the   Essential                 commodities   Act   have   been   amended   from   time   to   time   after   their   enactment.  The subsequent amendments of  the  Adulteration Act  and   of   the   Essential   Commodities   Act   by   the  Parliament and the   amendment of the Adulteration  rules would also tend to negative   any legislative  intendment   of     implied   repeal   of   the  Adulteration Act  by  the Essential Commodities Act  or the Fruit Order.”

31. In the decision reported in Zaverbhai Amaidas  v. The State of Bombay (1955 SCR 799) it has been  observed   that   if   there   is   conflict   between   the  Central   enactment   and   the   State   enactment   on   the  same   subject,   then   Central   enactment   will  prevail.The   same   principle   has   been   laid   down   in  the decision           reported in the Dharangadhra   Chemical       works v. Dharangadhra  Municipality   and   another   (AIR   1985   SC   1729).   In   the   decision  reported in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and   others   (AIR   1957   SC   458   =   1957   KHC   608),  the   Hon’ble       Supreme   Court   has   considered   the  question   as   to   whether   Sections   5   and   6   of  Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   has   impliedly  repealed, Section 405 and       409  of the Indian  Penal   Code     dealing   with   misappropriation   by   a  public servant and observed  that if he two offences  are distinct and separate, then one will not repeal  the another.  The same view has been reiterated in  the  decision  reported  in   State  of  Bombay  v.  S.L.   Apte (AIR 1961 SC 578 = 1961 KHC 537) wherein the  question   as   to   whether   the   provisions   of  Insurance  Act and   the offence under Section 105  of the Insurance Act and section 409 of the Indian  Penal   Code   are   similar   and   proceedings   against   a  person  under  both  the  acts  will  amount  to  double   jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of   India   and   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   has   held   that  they   are   distinct   and   separate   and   one   will   not  override   the   other   and   proceedings   against   the  person under both         the     enactments will not   amount   to   double   jeopardy   under   Article   20(2)   of  the Constitution of India. Further in the decision  reported in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and   others        (AIR 1989 SC 1= 1988 KHC 1071), the  Hon’ble   Supreme       Court has considered       the   question    as to whether   the offences under the  Wild   Life   (Protection)   Act,   1972   dealing   with  section 9(1) and Section 51 regarding wild life and  section   429   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   will   be  mutually exclusive and whether the earlier Act will   override the general provisions of the Indian Penal   Code   deals   with   the   same   subject   matter   observed  that   they   are   distinct   and         separate   and   that  cannot be         quashed     under section 482 of the  Code. With this principles in mind the case in hand  has to be considered.

32.   Further   in   the   decision   reported   in   Vishal  Agarwal   and   another   v.   Chhattisgarh   State  Electricity Board and another (2014 (1) KHC 319),  the  Hon’ble    Supreme  Court  has  held  that  Section   151   of   Electricity   Act,   2003   will   not   cause   any  fetter on the right of the police to investigate a  case   under   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   in  respect   of   any   cognizable   offence   has   been  committed which is an offence under the provisions  of the Indian Penal Code as well.

33.   The   same   view   has   been   reiterated   in   the  decisions   reported   in   State   (NCT   of   Delhi)   v.  Sanjay,   Jaysukh   Bavanji     Shingalia   v.   State   of  Gujarat and another, Malabhai Shalabhai Rabari and  others   v.   State   of             Gujarat   and   others,  Kalubhai Dulabhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat and another and Sondabhai Hanubhai Bharwad v. State of  Gujarat  and   another  (2014   (9)   SCC  772),  where  it   has been observed that provisions under the Mines  and Mineral  (Development              and    Regulation)  Act,       1957 is only barring investigation of an  offence   under   Section   4(1­A)   read   with   section  21(1) of MMDR Act and Magistrate taking cognizance  of the offence if it is an offence otherwise under  the Indian Penal Code that will not be a bar for  the police to investigate and file final report and  Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of   the   offence   for  that offence.   It is clear from the provisions of  the General Clauses Act that if the act committed  is   an   offence   under   two   enactments,   there   is  nothing  barring for  proceeding  against them  under  two    enactments but they cannot be sentenced for  the same separately. Further if they are distinct  and   different   offence,   then   there   is   no   bar   for  imposing separate sentence as well as it will not  amount to double jeopardy as provided under Article   20(2) of the Constitution of India.

34.   It   is   seen   from   the   allegations   in   the  complaint   filed   by   the   Food   Safety   Officer  under  the  Food  Safety  and  Standard  Act  that  only   the   first   petitioner   had   committed   the   offence  under that Act, as he being the licensee and owner  of the restaurant,  others who are involved in the  commission   of   the   act   have   not   been   implicated.  But in the case registered by the police apart from  the first petitioner, others   who are responsible  for running the restaurant and preparation of the  food and sale of the same were also implicated. The  procedure to be followed, nature of evidence to be  collected, points to be proved and ingredients of  the offence in both are entirely different. One is  a technical offence and other is an offence to be  proved   based   on   evidence   to   be   collected   by   the  investigating   agency.   Even   if   technical   offence  fails, the substantive offence investigated by the  police   on   the   basis   of   materials   collected   will  prevail over the other.

35.   If   the   intention   of   the   Legislature   is   to  repeal   or   remove   the   provisions   under   the   Indian  Penal Code also in respect of the offence relating  to     food,   then   they   ought   to   have   deleted   those  provisions   also   as   has   been   done   in   respect   of  giving   bribe   from   the   Indian   Penal   Code   when  Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   was   enacted   dealing  with those acts. That was not done in this case.   Further the Legislature was    very clear     when  a   schedule was added, they only repealed certain  enactments   which   were   dealing   with   sale   and  manufacture   of   food   earlier   and   not   all   the  provisions   which   were         dealing   with   the   same   subject   matter       in   the   other   enactments   like  Indian   Penal   Code   also.   The   above   view   is   clear  from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of  Bombay v. S.L. Apte (AIR 1961 KHC 537), Om Praksh  Gupta v. State of U.P (1957 KHC 608) and State of  Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and others (1988 KHC 1071)  as   well.   So   in   view   of   the   authoritative  pronouncement of the Supreme Court, I am with great  respect   disagreeing   with   the   dictum   laid   down   by  the   Allahabad   High   Court   in   Writ   Petition  No.8254(MB)/2010  M/s. Pepsico India Holdings (Pvt). Ltd and another v. State of U.P and others.

36. Further it is also seen from the court  before  whom the case is pending, which was instituted on  the basis of a complaint under the Food Safety and   Standard Act  though higher punishment  was provided  that   court   has   no   jurisdiction   to   award   such   a  punishment,     whereas       under   the   police  investigation   case,   it   will   be   committed   to   the  Sessions Court and     the Sessions     Court  has   power to  award severe punishment as provided under  the Indian Penal Code. Further if it is proved by  the   prosecution   that   the   persons   who   are   selling  the food articles were aware of the consequences of  the   food   being   sold,   which   is   likely   to   cause  injurious   to   health   and   even   cause   death,   then  apart   from   the   same   being   falling   under   the  provisions of the Food Safety and Standard Act, it  will  fall  under  the  provisions  of  Section  304  of   the Indian Penal Code as well, which is a distinct  and separate offence,  for which prosecution can be  independently proceeded with by the police on the  basis of a  complaint given by the affected party.  So only the offence under Section 59(3) of the Act  alone   can   be   proceeded   with   by   the   Food   Safety  Officer as an empowered officer and other offences  which   will   not   fall   under   that   Act   and   persons  against   whom prosecution can  be launched for the  same   offences,   who   are   not   covered   by   the   Food  Safety and Standard Act, the only remedy available  to the affected person is to move the police for   regular   investigation   under   the   Code   of   Criminal  Procedure and proceed against them  for the offence  provided under the general law namely Indian Penal  Code.  So, under the  circumstances, the submission  made  by  the  counsel  for  the   petitioners  that  the   police case initiated on the basis of the complaint  is   barred   in   view   of   the   provisions   of   the   Food  Safety and Standard Act is not sustainable and the  same is liable to be rejected  and the petitioners  are not entitled to get the relief quashing Crime  No.732/2012   of   Museum   police   station,  Thiruvananthapuram claimed in the petition and the  same is liable to be dismissed.”

24. Thus,   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the  Kerala High Court took the view that although  certain   provisions   of   the   IPC   and   the   Act,  2006 overlap on the same subject, yet it was  necessary   to   consider   as   to   whether   a   person  committed   the   offence   can   be   proceeded  against,   if   the   act   complained   of   may   be   an offence   under   two   enactments   independently,  would depend upon whether the offences alleged  are distinct and different or the same and by  virtue of the special Act being enacted on the  subject  matter  whether  the  general  provisions  would stand implidely repealed etc.

25. Even   in   a   case   of   a   provision   in   a  particular   Act   beginning   with   a   non   obstante  clause (“notwithstanding anything inconsistent  contained   therein   in   any   other   law   for   the  time   being   in   force”)   must   be   enforced   and  implemented by giving effect to the provisions  of the Act and by limiting the provisions of  the   other   laws.   But,   it   cannot   be   gain­said  that sometimes one may come across two or more  enactments   containing   a   similar   non   obstante  clause   operating   in   the   same   or   similar  direction. Obviously, in such cases, the Court  must attempt to find out the intention of the  Legislature   by   examining   the   nature   of  controversy,   object   of   the   Act,   proceedings  initiated,   relief   sought   and   several   other  relevant   considerations.   From   the   various  decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that  the   Courts   have   applied   several   workable  tests.   They,  inter­alia,   include   to   keep   in  view   whether   the   Act   is   ‘general’   or  ‘special’,   whether   the   Act   is   a   subsequent  legislation, whether there is reference to the  former   law   and   the   non   obstante   clause  therein.   The   above   tests   are   merely  illustrative   and   by   no   means   they   should   be  considered as exhaustive. It is for the Court  when   it   is   called   upon   to   resolve   such  conflict   by   harmoniously   interpreting   the  provisions of both the competing statutes and  by giving effect to one over the other. 

26. In   the   aforesaid   contest   I   may   refer   to  rely   upon   the   observations   of   the   Supreme  Court in the case of Central Bank of India v.  State of Kerala and Others, reported in 2009 4  SCC 94:­ “28.A non obstante clause is generally incorporated  in   a   statute   to   give   overriding   effect   to   a   particular section or the statute as a whole. While   interpreting   non   obstante   clause,   the   Cuourt   is  required   to   find   out   the   extent   to   which   the  legislature  intended   to   do   so   and   the   context   in  which the non obstante clause is used. This rule of  interpretation   has   been   applied   in   several  decisions.   In   State   of   West   Bengal   v.   Union   of  India,   it   was   observed   that   the   Court   must   ascertain   the   intention   of   the   legislature   by  directing its attention not merely to the clauses  to be construed but to the entire statute; it must   compare the clause with the other parts of the law   and   the   setting   in   which   the   clause   to   be  interpreted occurs. 

29. In  Madhav  Rao  Jivaji  Rao  Scindia  v. Union of  India and Anr. Hidayatullah, C.J. observed that the    non   obstante   clause   is   no   doubt   a   very   potent  clause   intended   to   exclude   every   consideration  arising from other provisions of the same statute  or other statute  but”for that reason alone we must   determine   the   scope”   of   that   provision   strictly.  When   the   section   containing   the   said   clause   does  not   refer   to   any   particular   provisions   which   it  intends to override but refers to the provisions of   the   statute   generally,   it   is   not   permissible   to  hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands all   alone   by   itself.   A   search   has,   therefore,   to   be   made   with   a   view   to   determining   which   provision  answers the description and which does not. 

30.   In   R.S.   Raghunath   v.   State   of   Karnataka   and   Anr., a three Judge Bench  referred to the earlier  judgments in Aswinin Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda BoseDominion  of   India  v.   Shrinbai  A.   Irani,   Union   of  India v. G.M. KokilChandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v.   Ashalata S. Guram and observed:] …The   non­obstante clause   is   appended   to   a  provision with a view to give the enacting part of   ithe  provision  an   overriding  effect   in   case   of   a   conflict.   But   the   non­obstante   clause   need   not  necessarily   and   always   be   co­extensive   with   the  operative part so as to have the effect of cutting   doen   the   clear   terms   of   an   enactment   and   if   the   words of the enactment are clear and are capable of  a clear interpretation on a plain and grammatical  capable   of   a   clear   interpretation   on   plain   and  grammitcal   construction   of   the   words   the   non­ obstante   clause   cannot   cut   down   the   construction  and   restrict  the  scope  of   its   operation.  In   such  cases   the   non­obstante   clause   has   to   be   read   as   clarifiying   the   whole   position   and   must   be  understood   to   have   been   incorporated   in   the  enactment   by   the   legislature   by   way   of   abundant  caution and not by  way  of limiting  the ambit and  scope of the special Rules.”

31. In A.G. Varadarajula v. State of Tamil Nadu,  this Court relied on Aswinin Kumar Ghose s. case.  The   Court   while   interpreting   non   obstante   clause  contained   in   Section   21­A   of   Tamil   Nadu   Land  Reforms   (Fixation   of   ceiling   on   Land)   Act,   1961  held:

It  is  well  settled  that  while  dealing  with  a non  obstante  clause  under  which  the   legislature  wants  to give overriding effect to a section, the court  must   try   to   find   out   the   extent   to   which   the  legislature   had   intended   to   give   one   provision  overriding   effect   over   another   provision.   Such  intention of the legislature in this behalf is to  be gathered from the enacting part of the section.  In   Aswini   Kumar   Ghose   v.   Arabinda   BosePatanjali  Sastri, J. observed:

The enacting part of  a  statute  must,  where  it is  clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause  where both cannot be read harmoniously;”

27. Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC, reads as  under:­ “Section 272:­ Adulteration of food or drink   intended   for   sale:­   Whoever   adulterates   any   article of food or drink, so as to make such   article noxious  as food or drink, intending   to   sell   such   article   as   food   or   drink,   or   knowing   it   to   be   likely   that   the   same   will   be sold as rood or drink, shall be punished   with   imprisonment   or   either   description   for   a   term   which   may   extend   to   six   months,   or   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   one   thousand   rupees, or with both.

Section   273:   Sale   of   noxious   food   or   drink:Whoever   sells,   or   offers   or   exposes   for   sale,   as   food   or   drink,   any   article   which   has   been   rendered   or   has   become   noxious, or               is in a state unfit for   food   or   drink,   knowing   or   having   reason   to   believe that the same is noxious as food or   drink,   shall be punished with imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term   which   may   extend to six months, or with fine which may   extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

28. Section   272   talks   about   adulteration   of  food   or   drink   intended   for   sale   and   Section  273 talks about sale of noxious food or drink.

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29. The offence under Section 272, IPC has the  following essentials:

(i)  Selling  or  offering  for  sale  as  food   or drink some article;

(ii) Such article must have become noxious   or   must   be   in   a   state   unfit   for   food   or   drink;

(iii) The sale or exposure must have been   made with a knowledge or reasonable belief   that   the   article   is   noxious   as   food   or   drink.

30. To bring home a charge under Section 273,  IPC the prosecution is to prove: (1) that the  accused sold or offered or exposed for sale an  article of food or drink; (2) that article of  food of drink has been rendered noxious or has  become   unfit   for   food   or   drink;   (3)   that  during   the   sale   or   offering   for   sale   or  exposing for sale he knew the article of food  or   drink   to   be   noxious   or   has   reason   to  believe so.

31. I am of the view that the ingredients to  constitute the offence under Sections 272, 273  of   the   IPC   viz­a­viz   the   offence   under   the  Food  Adulteration  Act  are  absolutely  distinct  and   it   is   difficult   to   take   the   view   that  Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC would never go   together   with   the   provisions   of   the   Food  Adulteration Act. In such circumstances, there  can be appropriate  complaint filed by the Food  Inspector   under   the   Provisions   of   the   Food  Adulteration   Act   and   simulteneously   if   there  is   sufficient   materials   the   accused   can   be  prosecuted for the offence  under Sections 272  and 273 of IPC on a Police report. 

32. The view taken by the Kerala High Court is  much more commendable and I propose to follow  the same.

33. However,   so   far   as   the   case   on   hand   is  concerned,   the   question   is   whether   there   is  any   materials   on   record   to   even   prima   facie  indicate   that   the   accused   persons   have  committed the offence under Sectins 406, 420,  272 and 273 of the Indina Penal Code. In the  facts of the case none of the ingredients to  constitute   the   offences   punishable   under  Sections 406, 420, 272 and 273 of the IPC are  spelt out.

34. The facts before the Kerala High Court in  the   case   of   Abdul   Khadar   (supra)   were   quite  different.

35. The   distinction   between   an   offence   under  Section   272,   IPC   and   offence   under   Section  16(1)   (a)   (i)   read   with   Section   7(i)  Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act,   1954   is  that when sale of adulterated food or drink is  punishable   under   the   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act,   adulteration   rendering   it  noxious with intention that it may be sold or  with   knowledge   that   it   may   be   sold   is   an  offence   under   Section   272   IPC.   Similarly   the  distinction   between   section   273,   IPC   on   the  one hand and on offence under Section 16(1)(a)

(i)   is   that   the   sale   of   adulterated   food  simpliciter   attracts   section   16(1)(a)(i)   read  with   Section   7(i)   P.F.A.   Act,   sale   of  adulterated   food   or   drink,   the   impugned  adulteration rendering it noxious and the sale  being   made   with   the   knowledge   that   it   is  noxious etc. attracts section 273, IPC.

36. It may be apposite to recall Section 2(ia)  Prevention   of   Food   Adulteration   Act,   1954  defining   adulterated   article   of   food   runs   as  under:­ (ia)   “adulterated”­an   article   of   food   shall be deemed to be adulterated­

(a)   if   the   article   sold   by   a   vendor   is    not   of   the   nature,   substance   or   quality   demanded  by the  purchaser  and is  to his   prejudice,   or   is   not   of   the   nature,   substance or quality which it purports or   is represented to be;

(b)   if   the   article   contains   any   other   substance   which   affects,   or   if   the   article   is   so   processed   as   to   affect,   injuriously   the   nature,   substance   or   quality thereof;

(c) if any inferior or cheaper substance   has been substituted wholly or in part of   the   article   so   as   to   affect   injuriously   the nature, substance or quality thereof;

(d) if any constituent of the article has   been  wholly  or  in part  abstracted  so as   to   affect   injuriously   the   nature,   substance or quality thereof;

(e)   if   the   article   had   been   prepared,   packed   or   kept   under   insanitary   conditions   whereby   it   has   become   contaminated or injurious to health;

(f) if the article consists wholly or in   part   of   any   filthy,   putrid,   rotten,   decomposed   or   diseased   animal   or vegetable substance or is insect ­infected   or   is   otherwise   unfit   for   human   consumption,;

(g)   if   the   article   is   obtained   from   a   diseased animal;

(h) if the article contains any poisonous   or   other   ingredient   which   renders   it  injurious to health;

(i)   if   the   container   of   the   article   is   composed,   whether   wholly   or   in   part,   of   any   poisonous   or   deleterious   substance   which   renders   its   contents   injurious   to   health;

(j)   if   any   colouring   matter   other   than   that   prescribed   in   respect   thereof   is   present in the article, or if the amounts   of the prescribed colouring matter which   is present in the article are not within   the prescribed limits of variability;

(k)   if   the   article   contains   any   prohibited   preservative   or   permitted   preservative in excess of the prescribed   limits;

(l)   if   the   quality   or   purity   of   the   article   falls   below   the   prescribed    standard or its  constituents  are present   in    quantities   not   within   the   prescribed   limits of variability, but which renders   it injurious to health;

(m)   if   the   quality   or   purity   of   the   article   falls   below   the   prescribed   standard or its constituents are present   in   quantities   not   within   the   prescribed   limits of variability but which does not   render it injurious to health;

Provided   that,   where   the   quality   or   purity   of   the   article,   being   primary   food,   has   fallen   below   the   prescribed   standards or its constituents are present   in   quantities   not   within   the   prescribed   limits   of   variability,   in   either   case,   solely   due   to   natural   causes   and   beyond   the   control   of   human   agency,   then,   such   article   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   adulterated   within   the   meaning   of   this   sub­clause. 

37. The expression, “noxious” has been defined  in   Section   2(xv),   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration Act as follows:

(xv)   the   words   “unwholesome”   and   “noxious”   when   used   in   relation   to   an   article   of   food   mean   respectively   that   the   article   in   harmful   to   health   or   repugnant to human use. 

38. The   word   noxious   appears   in   Rule   49,  Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. 

39. Rule 49(2) Prevention of Food Adulteration  Rules, 1955 lays down as one of the conditions  of sale of food or drink that no person shall  use   for   manufacturing   preparing,   or   storing  any   food   or   ingredient   of   food   intended   for  sale   any   utensil   or   container   which   is  imperfectly enamelled or imperfectly tinned or  which is made of such materials or is in such  a state as to be likely to injure such food or  render if noxious. 

40. Rule 49(4) further says that no utensil or  container   used   for   the   manufacture   or  preparation   of   or   containing   any   food   or  ingredient of food intended for sale shall be  kept   in   any   place   in   which   such   utensil   or  container is likely by reason of impure air or  dust or any offensive, noxious or deleterious  gas   or   substance   or   any   noxious   or   injurious  emanations, or exhalation, or effluvium, to be  contaminated   and   thereby   render   the   food  noxious. 

41. These   are   the   two   places   where   the   word  “noxious”   has   been   used   in   the   Act   and   the  Rules,   apart   from   s.2(xv)   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration Act referred to above. 

42. So, it emerges that actual adulteration of  food   or   drink   rendering   it   noxious   has   not  been contemplated by those Rules. 

43. Section 7, Prevention of Food Adulteration  Act,   laying   down   the   prohibition   of  manufacture, sale etc. of certain article lays  down the following in Clause (v) namely that a  sale of an article of food in contravention of  any   provision   of   the   Act   or   Rules   is  prohibited. It lays down in Clause (i) further  that sale of adulterated food is prohibited. 

44. Section   16(1)(a)   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Act   enacts  inter­alia,   that  whoever   sells   or   distributes   any   article   of  food,   sale   of   which   is   prohibited   under   any  provision of the Act or any rule thereunder is  liable to be visited with penalty. 

45. But, it may be found that Rule 49 does not  prohibit   actual   adulteration   rendering   the  food or drink noxious. So, Section 7(v) of the  Act   and   consequently,   Section   16(1)(a)(i)   is  not   attracted   when   the   food   or   drink   is   so  adulterated as to render it noxious. 

46. In this limited field Section 272, IPC has  its operation.

47. But,   at   the   same   time   to   bring   home  Section 272, IPC first and foremost ingredient  is that the accused must have adulterated the  food or drink.

48. Section   7(i),   Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration Act reads:

“S.7.   Prohibitions   of   manufacture,  sale etc. of certain articles of food –   No   person   shall,   himself   or   by   any  person   on   his   behalf,   manufacture   for  sale or store, sell or distribute­ 

(i) any adulterated food.”

49. So, it emerges that on proof of very first  ingredient of Section 272, IPC an accused may  be brought to book under Section 16(l)(a) read   with   Section   7(i)   of   the   Act.   If   the  prosecution   prosecutes   the   offender   for   more  adulteration,   the   matter   ends   there.   But   the  prosecution   on   proof   of   other   ingredients   of  Section   272,   IPC   discussed   above   can   also  bring   the   offender   to   justice   under   Section  272, IPC.

50. There   is   no   question   of   repeal   by  implication   as   it   cannot   be   said   that   the  aforesaid provisions of the Prevention of Food  Adulteration   Act   and   Section   272   occupy  entirely   the   same   field.   It   is   undoubtedly  true   that   the   legislature   can   exercise   the  power of repeal by necessary implication. But  it   is   equally   settled   that   there   is   a  presumption   against   an   implied   repeal.   Upon  the   assumption   that   the   legislature   enacts  laws with a complete knowledge of all existing  laws   pertaining   to   the   same   subject,   the  failure   to   add   a   repealing   cluase   indicates  that   the   intent   was   not   meant   to   repeal  existing  legislation.  The  presumption  will  be  rebutted if the provision of the new Act are  so inconsistent with the old one, that the two  cannot stand together vide the cases.

51. An analysis of Section 272, IPC shows that  to   bring   home   an   offence   under   Section   272,  IPC   the   prosecution   must   establish   the  following   :   (a)   an   article   of   food   or   drink  was   adulterated   by   the   accused.   (b)   this  adulteration   rendered   the   food   or   drink  noxious;   (c)   that   this   adulteration   was  intended   to   sell   the   food   or   drink   or   the  accused   knew   it   to   be   likely   that   the  adulterated and noxious food or drink would be  sold as food or drink. 

52. To bring home a charge under Section 272,  IPC the prosecution is to prove: (a) that the  accused adulterated a food or drink; (b) that  such   adulteration   rendered   the   food   or   drink  noxious; (c) that during the adulteration the  accused   intended   to   sell   the   said   article   of  food or drink or knew that it was likely to be  sold as pure food or drink.

53. There   is   nothing   on   record   at   this   stage  to   reach   to   the   conclusion   that   the  adulteration   of   the   “Ghee”   rendered   the   same  noxious.   The   report   of   the   Public   Analyst  dated 16th February, 2008 is as under:­

                        Sl.      Quality Characteristic                                   Result                                  Prescribed std. 

         No. of                                                            As per 
         T.R.                                                              Provision of 
                                                                           Act & Rules
         3        B.R. Reading at 40 c           50.4                      40 to 43.5
         4        Baudouin Test for              Positive                  Negative
                  Vanaspati
         5        Reichert Value                 7.2                       Min. 24
         6        Added Colour                   Turmeric                  Absent
                                                 Detected 
               

54. The   plane   reading   of   the   same   indicates  that the sample of “Ghee” in all respects was  found to be sub­standard and adulterated.

55. As noted above, for the offence under the  Food   Adulteration   Act,   the   applicants   are  independently being prosecuted pursuant to the  complaint   lodged   by   the   Food   Inspector  culminated in the Criminal Case No.841 of 2008  pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial  Magistrate,   Amreli.   The   Criminal   Case   No.841  of 2008 shall proceed further expeditiously in  accordance   with   law   without   being   influenced  in any manner by any of the observations made  in this judgment.

56. In the course of the trial of the Criminal  Case   NO.841   of   2008   i.e.   for   the   prosecution  under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  if   any,  prima­facie  evidence   surfaces   as   regards   the   commission   of   the   offence  punishable   under   Sections   272   and   273   of   the  IPC,   then   in   such   circumstances,   it   shall   be  open for the trial Court to add the charge for  the offence under  Sections 272 and 273 of the  IPC in exercise of its power under Section 216  of the Cr.P.C.

57. In the aforesaid context, let me refer to  rely on a decision of the Supreme Court in the  case   of  Rajiv   Kumar   Gupta   V.   State   of   Maharashtra, reported in 2006 Cr.LJ 581. I may  quote   the   observations   as   contained   in   para­ 26:­ “26.  The  learned  Counsel  further  contended  that  by  invoking   the   provisions   of   the   IPC   like   Sections  272, 273 and 420,  it amounts to exceeding  heir power  and   jurisdiction   as   the   Food   Adulteration   Act   and   the   said   Rules   made   thereunder   nowhere   give   them  such authority to launch prosecution under the IPC.  The   learned   Counsel   is,   however,   unable   to   submit   any supporting foundation to this proposition. There  is   no   bar   under   the   Food   Adulteration  Act   and   the  said   Rules   made   thereunder   that   the   concerned  authorities   under   the   Act   have   no   jurisdiction  and/or authority  to prosecute the guilty person for  the   offences   under   the   IPC   based   on   the   same  averments  along  with  the  provisions  of  the  special  statutes. All such authorities have jurisdiction to  launch a prosecution by invoking various provisions  of the IPC, along with the special statutes.” 

58. So far as the Criminal Case No.580 of 2008  pending   in   the   Court   of   the   learned   Chief  Judicial   Magistrate,   Amreli   arising   from   the  First Information Report being C.R. No. I­8 of  2008 registered with the Amreli Taluka Police  Station   is   concerned   the   same   is   quashed   on  the ground that the same is not in accordance  with law.

59. At   this   stage   it   is   appropriate   for   this  Court   to   state   that   if   proper   investigation  would   have   been   conducted   in   the   right  direction   and   in   accordance   with   law   then  probably   there   could   have   been   materials   on  record   to   show   that   the   food   article   was  noxious. 

60. In   the   result,   this   application   succeeds  and   is   hereby   allowed.   The   proceedings   of  Criminal   Case   No.580   of   2008   pending   in   the  Court   of   the   learned   Chief   Judicial  Magistrate,   Amreli   arising   from   the   First  Information Report being C.R. No. I­8 of 2008  is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute.

(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.) Manoj HC-Sat May 06 01:23:41 IST 2017

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